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FINDING TRADEMARK USE: THE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATION FOR LIMITING INFRINGEMENT
LIABILITY TO USES "IN THE MANNER OF A MARK"
Margreth Barrett*
Abstract
U.S. courts and scholars are debating the existence and scope of
a "trademark use" prerequisite for infringement liability, but
the discussion has lacked a proper grounding in the common
law and the legislative history of the Lanham Act. This Article
undertakes to fill that gap. The Article first evaluates the
common law of technical trademark infringement and unfair
competition as it existed and developed from the late 1800s to
1946, when the Lanham Act was enacted, and demonstrates
that the law imposed a form of "trademark use" limitation on
both the technical trademark infringement and the unfair
competition (trade name infringement) causes of action.
Having identified the trademark use limitation in the common
law, the Article then considers whether the Lanham Act
codified it. Through use of the Lanham Act's legislative
history, the Article demonstrates three different ways in which
the Lanham Act can be understood to have incorporated the
common law trademark use limitation: (1) through the "use in
commerce" language in the infringement provisions, coupled
with the Lanham Act § 45 definition of "use in commerce" (2)
through the phrase "on or in connection with" in the registered
and unregistered mark infringement provisions; and (3)
through implicit incorporation of the common law, even
without any express statutory language to that effect.
Finally, the Article discusses how the trademark use
requirement should be understood and defined in modern
contexts. The Article reviews the policy justifications for
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imposing the trademark use limitation and discusses the
flexibility that courts enjoy in construing and applying statutes
that undertake to codify common law doctrine. It then
describes three basic characteristics of a modern trademark use
limitation, based on public policy considerations and the
doctrine's historic formulation. To make a potentially
infringing "trademark use," the infringement defendant must
apply the allegedly infringing word or symbol in a manner: (1)
that consumers can perceive with their senses; (2) that closely,
directly associates the word or symbol with products or services
that the defendant is advertising, selling, or distributing to
consumers; and (3) that is likely to make a separate commercial
impression on consumers.
INTRODUCTION
"Trademark use" can be generally understood as use of a word
or symbol in close association with goods or services being offered for
sale, in a manner that is likely to communicate the source of those
goods or services to consumers. A sharp debate exists today, both in
the courts and in legal scholarship, about whether "trademark use"
is a prerequisite to finding trademark infringement, and if it is,
what should satisfy the "trademark use" requirement.
In the first four or five decades following enactment of the
Lanham Act,' courts occasionally recognized "trademark use" as a
necessary element of the infringement cause of action,2 but in most
case decisions courts identified only two major issues to be
addressed in evaluating an infringement claim: (1) whether the
plaintiff has enforceable trademark rights; and (2) whether the
defendant's use of its mark has caused a likelihood of consumer
confusion about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the parties'
respective goods or services. These decisions thus focused on the
ultimate impact of the defendant's use of a mark but not on the
nature of the defendant's use.
The courts may have overlooked the nature of the defendant's
use because, prior to the advent of the Internet, relatively few cases
arose in which infringement defendants had engaged in actions
beyond those traditionally understood to constitute trademark use.
However, the recent explosion of digital media has provided
defendants numerous opportunities to make innovative, unorthodox
1. The Lanham Act provides the United States' current federal trademark
and unfair competition law. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006).
2. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003);
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th
Cir. 1998); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir.
1996).
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applications of others' marks to accomplish a range of goals: to
divert on-line customers; to free-ride on the mark owner's business
good will; to gripe about the mark owner's product or service; or to
parody, criticize, or argue with the mark owner's social, political, or
religious views.3 The resulting avalanche of infringement suits
threatens to undermine years of careful judicial efforts to balance
the competing interests that come to bear in trademark
infringement cases.4 Allegations that these new, unorthodox kinds
3. For example, "cybersquatters" register domain names consisting of a
famous mark followed by a generic top level domain in hopes of selling the
registration to the owner of the mark for an inflated price. See Intermatic Inc.
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Individuals wishing to express
their dissatisfaction with a mark owner's product, or to parody the mark owner
or express disagreement with the mark owner's political, social, or religious
views set up websites for this purpose under domain names that incorporate the
target's mark. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney,
263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci,
No. 97 CIV.0629, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920
(2d Cir. 1998). Business entities doing business on the web have placed their
competitors' marks in metatags-hidden html code used by search engines in
formulating search results-to get their own sites listed when customers enter
their competitors' marks as search terms. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom
Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2008); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v.
W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). Most recently, purveyors
of advertising software and search engine services have sold their business
clients opportunities to have their own advertisements appear in "pop-up"
windows or banners when web users search for their competitors' mark or visit
the competitors' website. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414
F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354
F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp.
2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). For in-depth discussion of a range of such cases, see
Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of "Trademark
Use," 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006).
4. As I have discussed elsewhere, the ultimate purpose of trademark
protection is to foster competition. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 376-78.
("Trademark protection does this by preventing misleading uses of marks that
may confuse consumers about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the
products or services they buy. This reduces consumer search costs, promotes
marketplace efficiency, and enables producers to reap the benefits of their
investment in product quality and business goodwill, thus providing an
incentive to strive for quality. As the Senate Report accompanying the Lanham
Act stresses, trademark law, unlike the law of patents and copyrights, does not
convey monopoly rights in words and symbols because it was not created to
provide an incentive to innovate. Rather, businesses have 'property' rights in
their trademarks only to the extent necessary to prevent unauthorized uses
that cause a likelihood of consumer confusion. Such uses increase search costs
and undermine fair and efficient marketplace competition. . . . [T]rademark
protection is carefully tailored to accomplish these limited purposes because it
is generally understood that overprotection of marks may in itself impair
2008] 895
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of uses infringe are especially problematic because the realm of
actionable "likelihood of consumer confusion" has also expanded-
from consumer confusion about product source at the point of sale,
to confusion about sponsorship or affiliation, post-sale confusion,
pre-sale (or "initial interest") confusion, and even to non-confusion,
where the impact on the mark owner is similar to the impact that
consumer confusion might have.5  These expanded notions of
actionable confusion, in combination with new technological means
of applying and exploiting marks, enable trademark owners to
assert anticompetitive and potentially unconstitutional
infringement claims-to obstruct development of new technologies;
to censor and block the flow of truthful, useful market-related
information to consumers; and to interfere with constitutionally
protected free speech.
In searching for answers to this dilemma, litigants and courts
have looked to the statutory language of the Lanham Act's
infringement provisions. Under the Lanham Act, infringement
defendants must "use" marks "in commerce," "on or in connection
with"6 the sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services.
Some courts have relied on this language to limit infringement relief
to uses of marks in commercial or competitive contexts.7 Others
have gone well beyond that point, specifically recognizing
codification of a "trademark use" prerequisite, which requires that
infringement defendants use the allegedly infringing word or symbol
"as a trademark"8 to identify the source of goods or services.
competition and First Amendment interests. For example, trademark law only
protects 'distinctive' marks, because only distinctive marks are likely to signify
product source to consumers and because effective competition requires that
competitors have access to commonplace, descriptive, and generic words and
symbols. Protection only extends to nonfunctional marks to ensure that
trademark laws are not used to monopolize useful product and packaging
features that the patent and copyright laws relegate to the public domain.
Trademark law also applies the doctrine of exhaustion to ensure that marks are
available for use in resales and sales of secondhand marked products. Further,
in order to infringe a mark owner's rights, the defendant must have (1) used a
mark as a trademark (2) in a manner that causes a likelihood of consumer
confusion about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the parties' goods or
services." (citations omitted)).
5. For a famous example of the latter situation, see Brookfield
Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1036. For further discussion of the
expansion of the likelihood of confusion concept see Margreth Barrett, Domain
Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful
Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 984-85 (2007).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a); see also § 1127 (defining "use in
commerce").
7. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
8. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 400.
896 [Vol. 43
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However, even these latter courts have differed over the scope of
this "trademark use" requirement.
Thus, at this point in time, courts have begun regularly to recite
a "use in commerce" and/or "use in connection with goods or
services" prerequisite to infringement, along with "ownership of a
valid mark" and "likelihood of confusion." But there are notable
differences among the circuits concerning the source, scope, and
meaning of this "use" requirement. With regard to the source of the
use requirement, the Second and Eighth Circuits have expressly
relied on the "use in commerce" language in the Lanham Act's
registered and unregistered mark infringement provisions9 to
require that infringement defendants make a "trademark use" of the
allegedly infringing word or symbol.1 °  In construing "use in
commerce," these courts have looked to the definition of "use in
commerce" set forth in Lanham Act section 45." This definition
narrowly circumscribes the range of qualifying mark applications-
in the case of a trademark, the defendant must place the mark "in
any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale."2 By contrast,
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits" have expressly rejected
the notion that the "use in commerce" language plays any role in
defining infringement, other than to establish federal jurisdiction
under the Commerce Clause. 4 They have construed the section 45
definition of "use in commerce" only to define the kind of use a
trademark claimant must make to acquire ownership rights in a
mark.15 These courts have looked to the "on or in connection with"
goods or services language to find that an infringement defendant
must use the allegedly infringing mark in a commercial context.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a), 1127.
10. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 407; DaimlerChrysler AG v.
Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2003).
11. See 15 U.S.C § 1127.
12. Id.
13. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. &
Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1054 (10th Cir. 2008); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom
Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1220 n.7 (11th Cir. 2008); Bosley Med. Inst.,
Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d at 1054; N. Am. Med. Corp.,
522 F.3d at 1220 n.7; Bosley Med. Inst., Inc., 403 F.3d at 677. While the Fourth
Circuit has not expressly passed on this issue, it relies on the "on or in
connection with" language, rather than on the "use in commerce" language, to
find a "use" limitation on infringement claims. People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
20081
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The Sixth Circuit, while requiring that infringement defendants use
the allegedly infringing word or symbol "as a trademark," has cited
no statutory authority for that proposition. 6
With regard to the meaning and scope of the "use" requirement,
the circuits have split sharply over several issues. For example,
some courts have held that if a defendant incorporates a mark in a
domain name for a non-commercial website, but links that site to
other websites that sell or advertise goods or services, his use on the
non-commercial site satisfies the requirement that he use the mark
"in connection with" the sale or advertising of goods or services."
Others have rejected such a finding on the ground that the
association of a mark (on the linking site) to goods or services (on
the linked site) is too attenuated. 18 Moreover, some courts have
insisted that the defendant use the mark in connection with goods or
services it is itself offering for sale or advertising. Others have
found the requisite "connection" with goods or services when the
defendant's application of the mark affects the plaintiffs sales of
goods or services." Finally, courts have disagreed about whether the
defendant's intent should be relevant in determining whether its use
is actionable.21
Legal scholars have likewise divided over the existence and
16. See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134
F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86
F.3d 619, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1996).
17. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d 359; Jews for
Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998).
18. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d at 1052-53; Bosley Med. Inst.,
Inc., 403 F.3d 672; Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003);
Voice-Tel Enters., Inc. v. Joba, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2003);
Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
19. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d at 1053-54; Bosley Med. Inst.,
Inc., 403 F.3d 672; Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 777; Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp.
2d at 664-65; Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green
Nursing Ctr., 914 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Me. 1996).
20. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 365; Faegre &
Benson, LLP v. Purdy, No. Civ.03-6472, 2004 WL 167570 (D. Minn. Jan. 5,
2004), affd, 129 F. App'x 323 (8th Cir. 2005); Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at
309; Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 CIV.0629, 1997 WL
133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 834 (1998).
21. Compare Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998), Faegre & Benson, LLP, 2004 WL 167570 at *2;Jews for Jesus, 993 F.
Supp. at 282;and Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., 1997 WL 133313, with
Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 775,DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932,
937-39 (8th Cir. 2003),and Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661,
663-64 (E.D. Mich. 2001). For a third variation on this issue, see Bosley Med.
Inst., 403 F.3d 672.
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scope of the trademark use requirement. In an earlier article, I
described a doctrine of "trademark use" arising from the Lanham
Act's statutory language and that of earlier federal trademark acts,
and discussed how it should prevent infringement claims against
operators of gripe sites and other non-commercial "forum" websites
who incorporate their targets' marks into their domain names.22
Mark Lemley and Stacey Dogan published an article advocating
application of a trademark use requirement to prevent use of
infringement claims to block the flow of useful marketplace
information to Internet consumers.23 In rebuttal, Graeme Dinwoodie
and Mark Janis published an article characterizing "trademark use"
as a formalistic and arbitrary restraint that would undercut the
beneficial use of trademark law to police bad acting on the Internet.
They rejected the suggestion that there was any basis, either in the
common law or in the Lanham Act, for a trademark use•24
requirement. Mark McKenna has weighed in with arguments that,
even if the trademark use requirement exists in trademark law, it is
incapable of curbing the current excesses in infringement
litigation.25
Indeed, it appears that the "trademark use" debate is not
confined to the United States. Courts and scholars in a number of
countries have recently addressed the issue.26
In reviewing the judicial and scholarly debate about trademark
use in the United States, it becomes clear that the discussion has
been hampered by a lack of important information: there has not
22. Barrett, supra note 3.
23. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search
Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777 (2004); see also Stacey L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 1669 (2007); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of
Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (2004).
24. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion]; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis,
Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703 (2007)
[hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons].
25. Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 3 U. ILL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
26. See, e.g., Shell Co. of Austl. v. Esso Standard Oil (Austl.) Ltd. (1963)
109 C.L.R 407 (Austl.); Cie Generale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin &
Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada, [19961 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (Can.), [1996] 124 F.T.R. 192
(Can.), [1997] 2 F.C. 306 (Can.), 1996 CarswellNat 2297 (Fed. Ct. Dec. 19, 1996)
(Can.); Verimark (PTY) Ltd. v. BMW AG [20071 SCA 53 (RSA) (S. Mr.); R. v.
Johnstone, [2004] E.T.M.R. 18 (H.L.) (U.K.). See generally Po Jen Yap, Making
Sense of Trade Mark Use, 2007 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 420 (discussing
disagreement over whether the European Court of Justice has recognized a
trademark use requirement).
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been a sufficiently thorough evaluation of the pre-Lanham Act
common law to document the existence and scope of the trademark
use doctrine. Nor has there been a systematic review of the Lanham
Act's legislative history to determine whether, and to what extent,
Congress intended to incorporate such a common law doctrine into
the federal law of trademark infringement. This Article undertakes
to provide this missing information.
Section I provides a careful evaluation of the common law of
technical trademark infringement and unfair competition as it
existed and developed from the late 1800s to 1946, when the
Lanham Act was enacted. Subsection I. A first identifies the
"trademark use" limitation in the technical trademark infringement
cause of action, demonstrating how turn-of-the-century law required
that infringement defendants "affix" the allegedly infringing mark
to their goods. The Article then discusses how, between the late
1800s and 1946, courts liberalized the early trademark use
requirement, finding it to be satisfied when defendants used the
mark in advertising, or affixed the mark not directly to goods, but to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles used in
association with the goods' sale. (Hereafter I will refer to this
liberalized requirement as the "affixation or other close association"
standard.)
27
Subsection I. B then turns to the common law of unfair
competition and provides evidence of a trademark use requirement
that was somewhat looser than the early "affixation" requirement
for technical trademark infringement. It then explains how, by the
late 1930s, the "trademark use" requirement in unfair competition
law had become essentially equivalent to the liberalized "affixation
or other close association" requirement for technical trademark
infringement.2 8 This evolution is clear from the First Restatement of
Torts, published in 1938, which found that both the technical
trademark infringement and the unfair competition "trade name"
(or "secondary meaning mark") infringement cause of action
required a showing that the defendant used the contested
trademark or trade name "in the manner of a trade-mark or trade
name. "29 The Restatement defined use "in the manner of a trade-
mark or trade name" as use of the mark "so . . .that prospective
purchasers are likely to regard it as the name of, or the means of
identifying, [the user's] goods, services or business.
Having located the trademark use doctrine in the common law,
27. See infra Subsection I. A.
28. See infra Subsection I. B.
29. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 717 (1938).
30. Id. § 727.
[Vol. 43
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the Article then considers whether the Lanham Act, which was
enacted eight years after the Restatement of Torts was published,
codified that doctrine. Through use of the Lanham Act's legislative
history, Section II demonstrates three different ways in which the
Lanham Act can be understood to have incorporated the common
law trademark use requirement. Subsection II. D demonstrates
that Congress intended the Lanham Act infringement provisions'
"use in commerce" language to incorporate the liberalized "affixation
or other close association" requirement of the technical trademark
infringement law.3' Subsection II. E demonstrates how the Lanham
Act infringement provisions' "on or in connection with" the sale of
goods or services language can be understood to incorporate aS32
trademark use requirement. Finally, Subsection II. F explains how
the Lanham Act can be found implicitly to incorporate the
trademark use requirement from the common law, even in the
absence of any express statutory language to that effect.
3
Section III then draws from the previous sections to discuss how
the trademark use requirement should be understood and defined in
modern contexts. After briefly reviewing the policy justifications for
imposing the trademark use limitation,34 Subsection III. A explains
how the Lanham Act authorizes courts to construe and apply the
requirement flexibly in order to accomplish those policy goals. 35
Subsection III. B then describes the basic characteristics of modern
trademark use, in light of the doctrine's historical roots: a
trademark use must be perceptible to consumers' senses; must
closely associate the mark with goods or services that the defendant
is advertising, selling, or distributing; and must make a separate
36impact, or "separate commercial impression," on consumers.
II. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR "TRADEMARK USE": TRADEMARK USE
AS A COMMON LAW LIMITATION TO INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY
Understanding the common law of trademarks and unfair
competition as it existed during the fifty years leading up to 1946,
and enactment of the Lanham Act,37 is essential to construing the
Act's provisions regarding infringing trademark use.38 It is also very
31. See infra Subsection II. D.
32. See infra Subsection II. E.
33. See infra Subsection II. F.
34. See infra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Subsection III. A.
36. See infra Subsection III. B.
37. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006). The Lanham Act became
effective on July 5, 1947.
38. Examining the pre-Lanham Act common law on the issue of trademark
use can emulate the experience of the seven sightless men, who formed varying
2008]
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useful to evaluate the federal trademark acts that preceded the
Lanham Act. These earlier federal trademark acts were widely
understood and construed only to codify the common law of
trademarks, providing procedural advantages to registrants, but no
new substantive rights.39  To some extent, those earlier federal
trademark acts can be taken as restatements of the common law
standards.4"
Subsection A will set the stage by describing the distinctions
that the common law made between "technical trademarks," on one
hand and "trade names," or "secondary meaning marks," on the
other.4' It will focus particularly on three distinctions: (1) the
requirement that secondary meaning mark (unfair competition)
perceptions of an elephant, depending on the part they felt. The common law of
trademarks and unfair competition evolved over time, emphasizing, de-
emphasizing, and changing principles and elements at various stages of its
development. In addition, courts had an unfortunate tendency to use terms of
art loosely in some decisions and often worked from unstated assumptions that
might have been readily apparent to their contemporaries, but can be
frustratingly obscure to researchers who are seeking to understand their
decisions a century or so later.
In coming to grips with that earlier common law, I have found it useful
to resort not only to individual court decisions but also to contemporary
treatises and other learned commentaries on trademarks and unfair
competition. These sources provide useful overviews of the legal principles as
they were understood at the time, uniform definitions garnered from review of a
wide range of both federal and state decisions, and discussion of some of the
perspectives and assumptions underlying the case decisions of that period. For
present purposes, I found the American Law Institute's original Restatement of
Torts to be a particularly useful resource-it reflects the combined knowledge
and experience of some of the most eminent judges, law professors, and
practitioners of the 1930s. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 711-756 (1938).
Professor Harry Shulman, of the Yale University Law School, was the reporter
for Division 9, which restates the law regarding Interference with Business
Relations. The Advisory Group for Division 9 consisted of some of the top
trademark luminaries of that day, including Judges Learned Hand and
Augustus Hand of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Professor
Milton Handler of the Columbia University Law School.
39. Indeed, during most of that period it was commonly believed that
Congress lacked the authority, even under the Commerce Clause, to
substantively alter the common law principles that created, defined, and
protected rights in trademarks and other indications of source. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 715 cmt. f; 3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS § 67.4, at 1023 (2d ed. 1950); Walter J. Derenberg, The Patent
Office as Guardian of the Public Interest in Trade-Mark Registration
Proceedings, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 288, 288 (1949).
40. Moreover, their particular structure and language can provide useful
insights in construing the Lanham Act, which replaced them.
41. See infra Subsection II. A. 1.
[Vol. 43
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plaintiffs prove that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent;42 (2)
the requirement that technical trademark plaintiffs "affix" their
mark to their goods; 43 and (3) the requirement that technical
trademark plaintiffs prove that the defendant "affixed" the allegedly
confusing mark to its own goods." Subection A will demonstrate,
among other things, that the "defendant affixation" requirement
constituted a "trademark use" prerequisite to infringement liability
in technical trademark cases. In the nineteenth century, that
"affixation" requirement was not as broad as our understanding of
trademark use today. However, the requirement was liberalized
during the first half of the twentieth century to encompass a
number of other methods of closely associating a mark with
products, beyond mere "affixation."
Subsection B will demonstrate that the law of unfair
competition possessed its own trademark use limitation, which was
never as narrow as the nineteenth century "affixation" standard for
technical trademark infringement, but was essentially equivalent to
the liberalized "affixation or other close association" requirement,
into which the early "affixation" standard had evolved by 1946,
when the Lanham Act codified the common law."
A. The Common Law of Technical Trademarks and the Trademark
Use Requirement
1. The Distinction between Technical Trademark
Infringement and the Unfair Competition Cause of Action for
Secondary Meaning Mark (or "Trade Name") Infringement
At common law in the late 1800s and early 1900s, courts
distinguished between "technical trademarks," which were protected
through a suit for trademark infringement, and "trade names" (or
"secondary meaning marks"), which were protected (if at all)
through a suit for unfair competition. Understanding the
distinction, and the reasoning that led courts to make it, is an
important step in evaluating the extent to which pre-Lanham Act
law imposed a "trademark use" prerequisite to infringement
liability, and understanding some of the arguments that others have
46made about the extent or meaning of such a requirement.
42. See infra Subsection II. A. 2.
43. See infra Subsection II. A. 3.
44. See infra Subsection II. A. 4.
45. See infra Subsection II. B.
46. Understanding this development is also useful in reconciling the
requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate the defendant's trademark use as part
of their prima facie case of infringement with the Lanham Act's fair use
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Technical trademarks were what we would call "inherently
distinctive" marks today-words and symbols (or combinations of
words and symbols) that were "fanciful, arbitrary, unique,
distinctive, and nondescriptive in character,"47 and which the
claimant had physically affixed to articles of merchandise•. 4  Trade
names (including secondary meaning marks), by contrast, consisted
of words and symbols (or combinations of words or symbols) that
described their user's product or service, constituted geographical
terms, personal names, or designations common to the trade, or
constituted business or corporate names.49 While such common,
defense. See Margreth Barrett, Fair Use and Trademark Use (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
47. 3 CALLMANN, supra note 39, § 66.1, at 986; see also Milton Handler &
Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and Synthesis: I,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 169 (1930) [hereinafter Handler & Pickett I]. The
Restatement of Torts section 715 provided the following definition of a
trademark:
A trade-mark is any mark, word, letter, number, design, picture or
combination thereof in any form of arrangement, which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he
markets, and
(b) is affixed to the goods, and
(c) is not.., a common or generic name for the goods or a picture
of them, or a geographical, personal, or corporate or other
association name, or a designation descriptive of the goods or of
their quality, ingredients, properties or functions, and
(d) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is
prohibited neither by legislative enactment nor by an
otherwise defined public policy.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 (1938).
48. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 (1938).
49. 3 CALLMANN, supra note 39, § 66.1, at 986; Handler & Pickett I, supra
note 47, at 169.
At the time, courts generally described the unfair competition cause of
action as providing rights in "trade names." "Trade name" was a broad term,
encompassing both ordinary, descriptive, geographically descriptive, and
surname marks for products and services, and the names of businesses. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716; JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS,
TRADENAMES, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 3 (2d ed. 1905); 1 HARRY D. NIMS, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 185, at 512 (4th ed. 1947).
However, this Article focuses primarily on the unfair competition rules
regarding infringement of marks, rather than business names. Thus, for
clarity, rather than speaking of "trade name infringement," I will refer to
"secondary meaning mark infringement." When Congress enacted the Lanham
Act, it defined the term "trademark" to include all words, names, symbols or
device (or combinations thereof) used to identify the source of the user's
product, whether inherently distinction or not. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. It provided
for "service marks," which it defined as including words, names, symbols, and
devices (and combinations thereof) used to identify the source of the user's
services. Id. It redefined the term "trade name" narrowly to refer only to the
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descriptive, or "unaffixed" words or symbols could not be deemed
"trademarks," courts recognized that when a merchant employed
them for a long period of time in connection with its product, the
public might come to associate them with the user's business good
will and be confused upon encountering them in connection with a
competitor's product. In such cases (when the word or symbol had
acquired distinctiveness, or "secondary meaning," through long use
and public exposure) courts provided some protection against the
competitor's use.5° Because protection of secondary meaning marks
under these circumstances served the same essential function as
protection of trademarks, courts and commentators sometimes
referred to secondary meaning marks as "rights analogous to
trademarks."51
The courts distinguished between technical trademarks and
secondary meaning marks on the reasoning that a business could
legitimately appropriate a fanciful or arbitrary word or symbol to its
sole, exclusive use, with no harm to others. A technical trademark,
by definition, was either made up (and thus had no meaning) or had
a meaning that bore no descriptive or other logical relationship to
the user's product. Accordingly, competitors had no legitimate
name of a business. Id. That is the terminology that most modern courts,
practioners and scholars use today.
In this Article, I will use the term "secondary meaning mark" for
common, descriptive, geographically descriptive and surname marks that might
be protected under the common law cause of action for unfair competition, and
try to avoid use of the (once broader) term "trade name." However, to the extent
that this Article includes quotations from courts or other pre-Lanham Act
commentaries that incorporate the term "trade name," readers should
understand the reference to be directed (among other things) to secondary
meaning marks.
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 cmt. d; Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1295-96 (1940). The Restatement
of Torts section 716 defined a "trade name" (a category of indications of origin
that included secondary meaning marks-see note 49, supra) as follows:
A trade name is any designation which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he
markets or services which he renders or a business which he
conducts, or has come to be so used by others, and
(b) through its association with such goods, services or business,
has acquired a special significance as the name thereof, and
(c) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is
prohibited neither by a legislative enactment nor by an
otherwise defined public policy.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716.
For a definition of secondary meaning, see id. at comment b. The overall
appearance of a product label or its packaging often were also treated as a form
of trade name.
51. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 49, § 19, at 42.
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reason to adopt the same word or symbol to identify or describe their
similar goods. If they did so, they likely did it for the purpose of
perpetrating a fraud on the mark owner or the public.52 Their action
could be characterized as an invasion of the first user's property
rights."
In contrast, trade names consisted of descriptive, surname,
geographic, and other words and symbols commonly used in the
trade, such as colors, squares, circles, stripes, or other common
shapes. Numerous competitors might legitimately want to use such
words and symbols in their own marketing activities. A business
that adopted such a word or symbol as its mark or name had no
right to expect exclusivity. As one court put it:
The alphabet, English vocabulary, and Arabic numerals, are to
man, in conveying his thoughts, feelings, and the truth, what
air, light, and water are to him in the enjoyment of his
physical being. Neither can be taken from him. They are the
common property of mankind, in which all have an equal share
and character of interest. From these fountains whosoever
will may drink, 54but an exclusive right to do so cannot be
acquired by any.
52. See, e.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409 (2d
Cir. 1917) ("To use precisely the same mark, as the defendants have done, is, in
our opinion, evidence of intention to make something out of it-either to get the
benefit of the complainant's reputation or of its advertisement or to forestall the
extension of its trade. There is no other conceivable reason why they should
have appropriated this precise mark.").
53. 3 CALLMANN, supra note 39, § 66.1, at 986 (explaining that trademarks
could be appropriated for the use of one person); 1 NIMS, supra note 49, § 10, at
66 ("The words or insignia involved in technical trade-mark cases usually are of
such a character that they may be appropriated to the use of one person
exclusively, while in unfair competition cases the words or symbols involved
usually are not capable of exclusive appropriation because others may rightfully
use them."); Grover C. Grismore, Fraudulent Intent in Trade Mark Cases, 27
MICH. L. REV. 857, 863-64 (1929) (explaining that technical trademarks were
property rights, unlike trade names); see also Robert G. Bone, Hunting
Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 547, 552, 560-72 (2006) (explaining the history and reasoning that led
courts to consider technical trademarks as "property" for a period of time).
54. Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 81 Ky. 73, 90 (Ky. 1883); see also
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear & Ripley, 2 Sand. Ch. 599, 606-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1849) (Duer, J.) (One merchant "has no right . .. to appropriate a [term,
signifying some fact] which.., others may employ with equal truth."); Fetridge
v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857) (Duer, J.) (Rights in
descriptive terms would be "a species of property that ... can be given to one-
[only] by the infringement of the rights of all."); Grafton Dulany Cushing, On
Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322 (1891)
(explaining why certain works and symbols were excluded from trademark
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There were multiple reasons to prevent one merchant from
acquiring exclusive rights in descriptive, geographic, or other
common words and symbols. Judge Leval has explained that the
rule was intended to protect important First Amendment interests.5
Others have noted that the practice protected the interest in
efficient marketplace competition and prevented monopolies in
language that might lead to monopolies in products.56 However,
while the common law permitted all competitors to employ
descriptive and common words and symbols in their ordinary
meaning, it did not permit them to use such words or symbols for the
purpose of committing fraud. As the Eighth Circuit put it:
Everyone has the right to use and enjoy the rays of the sun,
but no one may lawfully focus them to burn his neighbor's
house .... Every one has the right to use pen, ink, and paper,
but no one may apply them to the purpose of defrauding his
neighbor of his property, or making counterfeit money, or of
committing forgery.
5 7
When competitors intentionally used a secondary meaning
mark for the purpose of confusing consumers about the source of
their goods, thus diverting trade from an earlier user, courts would
intervene-not on the ground that the plaintiff had property rights
in the word or symbol (as might be the case with regard to a
technical trademark),5 but because the defendant/competitor was
protection).
55. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 187, 189-92 (2004).
56. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871); Handler & Pickett I, supra
note 47, at 170.
57. Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 F. 821, 827 (8th Cir. 1901); see also
Cushing, supra note 54, at 324 ("The distinction between the law of trade-
marks and of cases analogous to trade-marks [secondary meaning marks], I
understand to be this: In cases of trade-mark there is a definite exclusive right,
... which may be infringed in certain definite ways. The right is recognized as
being exclusively the plaintiffs, and, indeed, it is by virtue of his exclusive right
that he gets relief. Unless he has a trade-mark within these technical rules he
has no exclusive right and can get no relief .... In cases analogous to trade-
marks, the right of the plaintiff is only against a particular defendant by reason
of his fraud .... ").
58. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 717 cmt. a (1938) (explaining that for a
period of time, some courts in equity characterized the plaintiffs technical
trademark as "property," but that this view did not ultimately prevail).
However, this view helped to establish the rule that fraud was not an essential
element of technical trademark infringement (as opposed to secondary meaning
mark infringement)); 1 NIMS, supra note 49, §§ 10-11, at 66-70 (noting that
technical trademarks often were referred to as property rights, although that
characterization was also often disputed); see also Bone, supra note 53, at 560-
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engaged in fraudulent conduct.59 One court explained:
The infringement of trademarks is the violation by one
person of an exclusive right of another person to the use of a
word, mark or symbol. Unfair competition in trade, as
distinguished from infringement of trademarks, does not
involve the violation of any exclusive right to the use of a word,
mark or symbol .... [Secondary meaning marks are] open to
public use "like the adjectives of the language," yet there may
be unfair competition in trade by an improper use of such
word, mark or symbol. Two rivals in business competing with
each other in the same line of goods may have an equal right
to use the same words, marks or symbols on similar articles
produced or sold by them respectively, yet if such words,
marks or symbols were used by one of them before the other
and by association have come to indicate to the public that the
goods to which they are applied are of the production of the
former, the latter will not be permitted, with intent to mislead
the public, to use such words, marks, or symbols in such a
manner ... as to deceive or be capable of deceiving the public
as to the origin, manufacture or ownership of the articles to
which they are applied.... 6 0
Thus, when a common, descriptive, geographically descriptive
or surname word or symbol acquired secondary (source-indicating)
meaning by virtue of its claimant's long or heavy use in the course of
marketing its product, competitors could employ it in its "primary"
sense (that is, in its common descriptive, geographic, or surname
sense), but they would not be permitted intentionally to use it in its
secondary (or trademark) sense.6 '
72 (describing the historical development and decline of the notion that
technical trademarks constitute "property").
59. HOPKINS, supra note 49, § 19, at 40-41; see Milton Handler & Charles
Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and Synthesis: 11, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 759, 769 (1930) [hereinafter Handler & Pickett III (stating that
in unfair competition-as contrasted to technical trademark cases-fraud was
said to be "the essence of the wrong"); HOPKINS, supra note 49, § 17, at 35 ("If
the use of any words, numerals or symbols is adopted for the purpose of
defrauding the public, the courts will interfere to protect the public from such
fraudulent intent, even though the person asking the intervention of the court
may not have the exclusive right to the use of these words, numerals or
symbols." (quoting Charles E. Coddington, Digest § 36 (1877))).
60. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 659 (C.C.D. Del.
1899).
61. In a secondary meaning mark case in which the plaintiff could
demonstrate secondary meaning and the defendant's fraudulent intent, the
defendant would be required to confine his use of the word to its primary sense.
See Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901); see
908 [Vol. 43
HeinOnline -- 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 908 2008
IN THE MANNER OF A MARK
Given this differing view of merchants' interests and rights in
technical trademarks and secondary meaning marks, the causes of
action courts developed to vindicate these interests-trademark
infringement and unfair competition-differed as well. To own a
valid technical trademark, a claimant had to "affix" the mark to the
merchandise it sold, while the unfair competition claimant did not
have to demonstrate that it physically attached its word or symbol
to the good, service, or business it was used to identify. 2 Moreover,
technical trademark claimants alleging infringement had to
demonstrate that the defendant "affixed" (physically attached) a
similar mark to similar goods, while plaintiffs in secondary meaning
mark infringement cases did not have to demonstrate physical
"affixation" on the defendant's part. 3
On the other hand, to assert rights in a secondary meaning
mark, the claimant had to demonstrate that the public associated
the mark with his or her particular goods or services (that is, that
the mark had "secondary meaning" to the public-meaning as an
indication of source, in addition to its original descriptive,
geographic, or surname meaning), while the technical trademark
claimant did not.64  In addition, plaintiffs in secondary meaning
infringement cases generally had to demonstrate that the defendant
acted with fraudulent intent, while courts would presume fraud in
technical trademark infringement cases.5 Indeed, there was some
suggestion that courts would presume a likelihood of confusion in
technical trademark infringement cases when the defendant placed
a highly similar mark on similar goods, while plaintiffs in secondary
meaning mark cases always were required to demonstrate that the
also 2 NIMs, supra note 49, § 319, at 1016 ("[U]se of a word in the public domain
is unfair only when used in its trade-mark or secondary sense, not in its
common or primary sense."); Grismore, supra note 53, at 863-64 (explaining
that the purpose of unfair competition law is "to safeguard the plaintiff in the
secondary meaning which the word has acquired in relation to the goods which
he puts upon the market, and also to permit the defendant to use it in its
primary sense").
62. Handler & Pickett I, supra note 47, at 168. It is important to note that
technical trademark law only protected source-indicators for goods. Unfair
competition extended to source indicators for goods, services, and businesses as
a whole. One cannot physically attach a word or symbol to a service or a
business as a whole.
63. See infra notes 89-128 and accompanying text. As the cited material
explains, plaintiffs alleging infringement of secondary meaning marks did have
to demonstrate a looser form of use "in the manner of a trade name or
trademark."
64. 1 NIMs, supra note 49, § 221(b), at 668; Handler & Pickett I, supra note
47, at 168-69.
65. Handler & Pickett I, supra note 47, at 168-69.
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defendant's actions caused a likelihood (or even a probability) of
consumer confusion.66 Finally, while courts typically would enjoin
the technical trademark infringement defendant from all uses of the
plaintiffs mark, courts often tailored injunctive relief more narrowly
in secondary meaning mark cases, to permit uses of the secondary
meaning mark in its original (non-source-indicating) meaning.67
There is a certain logic to these distinctions, though they may
seem somewhat artificial today (and, indeed, were often criticized as
artificial even during the first half of the 1900s).68 If courts were to
dispense with a showing of secondary meaning, presume fraud, and
(possibly) presume a likelihood of confusion in technical trademark
infringement cases, it made sense to impose rather strict
restrictions on the circumstances in which technical trademark
infringement could be alleged, to ensure that these dispensations
and presumptions could be justified. If the plaintiff had not
physically placed the arbitrary or fanciful word or symbol on its
goods, courts could not necessarily presume that the mark served to
identify the source of the goods. If the defendant did not physically
attach a highly similar mark to the same kind of goods, it could not
be presumed that his purpose was fraudulent and that his actions
were likely to confuse consumers. If one or both of these technical
"affixation" requirements was not met, the plaintiff could always
turn to an unfair competition (secondary meaning mark
infringement) cause of action, which would provide relief if the
plaintiff could meet its higher burden of proof.
Moreover, given the courts' concerns about the anticompetitive
effects of removing common, descriptive, geographic, and surname
words and symbols from the commons, and their reasoning that
rights in such words and symbols should only be recognized to
prevent fraudulent conduct, it made sense to require proof that the
plaintiffs alleged source indicator had acquired secondary
meaning-(1) to ensure that the plaintiff had a meaningful interest
to protect against fraudulent misappropriation; (2) to ensure that
the defendant's alleged fraud would actually harm consumers'
reliance interests; and (3) to make it more likely that the defendant
did act with a fraudulent intent. It also made sense to require a
specific demonstration of fraudulent intent on the defendant's part
and a likelihood of consumer confusion, thus ensuring that the
66. 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
MARKS § 66.1, at 815 (1945); 1 NIMS, supra note 49, § 221(b), at 668-69; Handler
& Pickett I, supra note 47, at 169. For additional background on this issue, see
Restatement of Torts section 717 comment a; Bone, supra note 53, at 564-65.
67. CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 66.1 at 815.
68. See, e.g., Handler & Pickett I & II, supra notes 47 & 59 passim.
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potential harm to the claimant and the public was sufficiently great
to justify even limited removal of common, descriptive, geographic,
and surname words and symbols from the commons.
The following subsections more fully explore three differences
between the technical trademark infringement and unfair
competition (secondary meaning mark infringement) causes of
action: (a) the requirement that secondary meaning mark claimants
demonstrate fraudulent intent on the defendant's part; (b) the
requirement that technical trademark claimants "affix" their marks
to their products; and (c) the requirement that technical trademark
infringement claimants demonstrate that the defendant "affixed"
the mark to its own goods.
2. Fraudulent Intent in Secondary Meaning Mark (Unfair
Competition) Cases
As noted above, courts in secondary meaning mark
infringement (unfair competition) cases required that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the defendant acted fraudulently, with bad-faith
intent to pass off its goods or services as those of the plaintiff, while
courts in technical trademark infringement cases imposed no such
requirement.69 This "fraud rule" was reiterated in a line of Supreme
Court decisions.7° However, by the late 1800s, English courts had
moved away from requiring fraudulent intent in unfair competition
69. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. For further explanation
of how courts came to make this distinction between trademarks and secondary
meaning marks, see Restatement of Torts section 717 comment a; HOPKINS,
supra note 49, § 19, at 45 & nn.20-21; see also Handler & Pickett II, supra note
59, at 769 ("Many courts have sharply differentiated between the fraud
requirement in the equitable actions of trade-mark infringement and unfair
competition. In trade-mark cases fraud is said to be immaterial or 'conclusively
presumed' from the fact of infringement, whereas in unfair competition, it is of
the essence of the wrong.").
70. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461, 468-71 (1914)
(suggesting that when secondary meaning marks were federally registered
under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 "10-year rule," the registrant did not need to
demonstrate wrongful intent on the defendant's part, but implying that proof of
wrongful intent would be required under the common law for unregistered
secondary meaning marks); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Case Co., 179
U.S. 665, 674 (1901) (stating that if the plaintiff has demonstrated a technical
trademark infringement the defendant's wrongful or fraudulent intent is
presumed; but in the case of secondary meaning marks, "such circumstances
must be made out as will show wrongful intent in fact, or justify that inference
from the inevitable consequences of the act complained of"); Lawrence Mfg. Co.
v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 549, 551-52 (1891) (requiring proof of intent in
cases where no fanciful trademark is involved); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S.
245, 254 (1877) (requiring proof of fraudulent intent to deceive in unfair
competition cases).
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71cases, as had a significant number of state courts.72 As the United
States progressed further into the twentieth century, courts and
commentators increasingly criticized the fraud requirement,
reasoning that technical trademark infringement and secondary
meaning mark infringement caused the same injury to business
good will and consumer reliance interests, and that the focus in such
cases should be on the effect of the defendant's acts, rather than onthe efedants " 73
the defendant's intent. In secondary meaning mark cases, courts
began more readily to infer fraudulent intent from the similarity of
the parties' words or symbols, or from other circumstances in the
74case.
In 1930, Professor Milton Handler, an acknowledged authority
on trademark and unfair competition law, characterized federal
courts' routine recitation of the "fraud rule" as dicta and argued that
the outcome of technical trademark and secondary meaning mark
71. See 2 NIMS, supra note 49, § 351, at 1087, 1089.
72. Id. Nims also lists and discusses some lower federal court decisions
that appeared not to require a demonstration of fraud in unfair competition
cases, though he suggests that this may have resulted at least in part from
those courts' mistaken reliance on precedent from technical trademark
decisions. But see Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 770 (suggesting that
while courts often recited the fraud rule in unfair competition cases, the
outcome in these cases rarely differed from the outcome in technical trademark
infringement cases).
73. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a (1938) ("A trade name is
... no less effective than a trade-mark as a means of identification. Whether a
designation identifies the goods of one person is a question of fact necessary to
be answered in determining whether the designation is a trade name. When
that determination is made, there is no more reason for the requirement of
'fraud' in the trade name cases than in the trade-mark cases."); CALLMANN,
supra note 66, § 86.1(a), at 1399, 1401 (claiming that the vital question today is
not "what did defendant mean but what has he done?"); 2 NIMS, supra note 49, §
351, at 1087-89 (describing a gradual trend among courts to focus more on the
effect of the defendant's actions, which-in cases where marks had acquired
secondary meaning-was very similar to the effect of technical trademark
infringement).
74. See, e.g., CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 86.1(a), at 1398 (In secondary
meaning mark cases, "the early law of this country read that fraud on the part
of the defendant was the essence of the wrong and that proof thereof was a
condition precedent to relief. As the law developed, the concept of 'fraud' was
enlarged."); 2 NIMS, supra note 49, § 351, at 1089 (describing a trend on the part
of courts to place less emphasis on the distinction between technical trademark
infringement and unfair competition and to stress evidence on which inferences
of fraudulent intent might be based when no direct evidence of intent was
available); Grismore, supra note 53, at 864-65 (noting a tendency in the courts
to modify the fraud requirement in unfair competition cases "by relaxing the
requirements in regard to the character and the quantum of the proof necessary
to make out a case of fraudulent intent," and providing examples).
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infringement cases was almost always the same.5 Notwithstanding
the "fraud rule," courts routinely granted injunctions in unfair
competition cases even in the absence of meaningful evidence that
the defendant intended to trade on the plaintiffs business good
will. 6 Handler and his co-author noted that the "fraud" required for
a finding of unfair competition was not equivalent to technical deceit
and had come to mean little more than a conscious use of a
confusingly similar mark.77
Eight years later, the American Law Institute published the
Restatement of Torts, which found that there was no longer any
meaningful distinction, with regard to fraud, between trademark
and secondary meaning mark infringement. Eight years after the
Restatement was published, Congress enacted the Lanham Act,
which consolidated the law governing technical trademarks and
secondary meaning marks and dispensed with the fraudulent intent
requirement in all infringement cases, whether they involved
inherently distinctive marks or "secondary meaning" marks, and
regardless of whether the plaintiffs mark was registered7 9 or
unregistered."
3. The Requirement that Technical Trademark Claimants
"Affix" Their Marks to Their Products
As noted above, in the late 1800s and the first half of the 1900s,
a technical trademark was defined as an inherently distinctive word
or symbol that the plaintiff physically "affixed" to its articles of
merchandise, or its containers, to indicate their source. 81 A claimant
who failed to "affix" its mark would have no cause of action against
75. Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 770.
76. Id. at 770-75.
77. Id. at 770.
78. RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 717, cmt. a. The Restatement noted, however,
that the issue of deliberate fraud was not irrelevant, as its presence may
substantially affect the scope of relief afforded in either a trademark or a
secondary meaning mark infringement case. Id.
79. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).
80. Id. § 1125(a). The requirement that defendants act with fraudulent
intent to trade on the plaintiffs good will may explain, in part, why the
trademark use requirement was looser in the unfair competition cases than in
technical trademark infringement cases. See supra note 63 and accompanying
text. Moreover, the common law requirement of fraudulent intent in cases
alleging infringement of common, descriptive, geographic and surname words
and symbols is also relevant to understanding and construing the Lanham Act's
fair use defense, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), and its modern common law equivalent.
See Barrett, supra note 46.
81. CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 98.6, at 1696-98; 1 NIMS, supra note 49, §
218, at 636-37; Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 759-62.
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others for technical trademark infringement."2
However, such a claimant could assert a claim for unfair
competition because the law of unfair competition did not require a
plaintiffs physical "affixation" as a prerequisite to relief.8 3 This
difference between technical trademark infringement and unfair
competition made sense, because the law of unfair competition
protected a broader range of indications of origin-not just marks
for physical products, but also marks for intangible services and the
names of businesses as a whole. Physical affixation was not possible
in many unfair competition cases. And the law's requirement that
the plaintiff demonstrate secondary meaning as a prerequisite to
relief alleviated any concerns about whether the claimant had
effectively used the mark to indicate source.8 Finally, as noted
earlier, the common law of unfair competition primarily focused on
the fraudulent nature of the defendant's conduct, rather than on
recognition of property rights in the plaintiff.
"Affixation," as it was defined in early common law, was a
narrow, technical requirement. The purpose of requiring a
plaintiffs affixation clearly was to ensure that the claimant had
used the word or symbol as a trademark, to indicate source, and
thus was in legitimate need of protection.m There are, of course,
other ways to use a word or symbol to indicate product source, but
affixation to goods or containers can be characterized as the most
obvious, certain way to utilize a word or symbol to indicate source
and safely to assume that consumers will rely upon it for that
purpose. Thus, courts may have conditioned technical trademark
protection on the plaintiffs affixation in order to ensure that the
law's presumptions of fraud and consumer confusion, and its
dispensation with any secondary meaning requirement, were
warranted.86 In 1930, Professor Handler argued that the affixation
82. See, e.g., Parsons Trading Co. v. Hoffman, 177 N.Y.S. 713, 715 (Sup.
Ct. 1919), affd, 192 N.Y.S. 942 (App. Div. 1922) (holding that use of mark on
invoices did not constitute affixation); St. Louis Piano Mfg. Co. v. Merkel, 1 Mo.
App. 305 (Ct. App. 1876) (finding that plaintiff failed to state cause of action for
technical trademark infringement because it had not affixed its mark to its
pianos, even though it had used the mark extensively to identify the pianos in
advertisements).
83. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 715 cmt. a, 718 cmt. a.
84. Id. § 716 cmt. a.
85. See, e.g., 1 NIMS, supra note 49, § 218, at 637 (pointing out that the
plaintiffs affixation must be "appropriate to the fulfillment of the purpose of the
trade-mark. It must be so attached as to enable it to function as a trade-mark.
It must be reasonably permanent, visible, and placed so that purchasers of the
goods can use it to identify their origin").
86. The Restatement of Torts notes that while one might demonstrate
adoption and use of a mark without affixation, the common law's technical
[Vol. 43
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requirement was antiquated and unnecessary and advocated its
elimination. However, the Restatement of Torts retained the
"plaintiff affixation" requirement for trademarks, and the Lanham
Act also retained it, albeit in a somewhat more relaxed form."8
Indeed, in the course of consolidating registration and legal
protection for technical trademarks and secondary meaning marks,
the Lanham Act extended the "plaintiff affixation" requirement to
secondary meaning marks.
A final point to stress is that the common law requirement that
the plaintiff affix a technical trademark is entirely separate from
the requirement that the defendant "affix" the mark, or make some
other "trademark use" of it. The latter requirement is discussed
below.
4. Affixation as a Prerequisite for Technical Trademark
Infringement Liability
A final difference between technical trademark infringement
and secondary meaning mark infringement under the law of unfair
competition was that in order to prevail in technical trademark
infringement, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendant
"affixed" a confusingly similar word or symbol to his or her own
merchandise. As this requirement was originally stated and
construed, a defendant's use of the word or symbol in advertising, on
business-related documents, or as a business name or service mark
generally, would not suffice to demonstrate technical trademark
infringement.8 9
affixation requirement avoids the necessity of resolving sharply disputed issues
of fact. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 718 cmt. a. Professor Handler agreed that
"the act of affixation is objective evidence of adoption, proof of which can easily
be adduced for purposes of corroboration in the event that priority of
appropriation is disputed." Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 760.
However, he suggested that the courts' main motivation in requiring affixation
was a desire to avoid monopolization of markets through use of marks. Id. at
761. The Restatement also notes historical reasons why courts required
affixation-because trademarks developed from production marks, which were
necessarily affixed to the goods. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 718 cmt. a.
87. Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 759-62.
88. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127 (2006).
89. See, e.g., Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 87 N.E. 674, 675-76 (N.Y. 1909).
Plaintiff used the word "Lilliputian" both in its business name and as a mark
for its products. The defendant incorporated "Lilliputian" into its business
name and advertisements but did not use it as a mark for its own merchandise.
Drawing on the affixation distinction, the court found that the plaintiff could
recover for unfair competition, but not trademark infringement. Id. See also
New York Mackintosh Co. v. Flam, 198 F. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), where the
defendant made an exact copy of the defendant's distinctive picture trademark
2008]
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A large portion of the cases that stated and applied this
proposition were federal cases considering infringement claims
brought by trademark owners who had registered their marks
pursuant to the federal trademark acts that preceded the Lanham
Act.9°  These early trademark acts all expressly imposed the
affixation requirement in their infringement provisions. However,
on cards, letterhead, and order forms. The court noted that the defendant's
picture "would clearly have infringed" if it had been attached to the defendant's
merchandise. However,
[a] trade-mark is something attached to the goods, or the receptacles
containing them, which the buyer sees, and by which the goods
become known to the buyer .... [U]se of [the mark on defendant's]
business papers, while affording strong proof of unfair competition in
trade, is, in my opinion, no proof of infringement of the trade-mark.
Id.; see also Dwinell-Wright Co. v. Nat'l Fruit Prod. Co., 140 F.2d 618, 621 (1st
Cir. 1944); Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1942) (finding
that the plaintiffs trademark infringement claim is sufficient because the
defendant "does affix an 'imitation' of the mark to 'receptacles intended to be
used . . . in connection with the sale' of gasoline"); James Heddon's Sons v.
Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 8 (6th Cir. 1942) (finding
applicable rule of law to be that one must affix the trademark of another to
similar articles in order to be liable for trademark infringement); Walgreen
Drug Stores, Inc. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1940);
Gold Dust Corp. v. Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 451, 452 (2d Cir. 1937) ("Infringement of
a trade-mark consists in the unauthorized use or colorable imitation of the
mark already appropriated by another, upon goods of a similar class.") (quoting
Block v. Jung Arch Brace Co., 300 F. 308, 309 (6th Cir. 1924)); Ironite Co. v.
Guarantee Waterproofing Co., 64 F.2d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 1933) (requiring
showing that defendant affixed objectionable mark to packages in an action at
law for trademark infringement); Block, 300 F. at 309 ("Infringement of a trade-
mark consists in the unauthorized use or colorable imitation of the mark
already appropriated by another, upon goods of a similar class."); Diederich v.
W. Schneider Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., 195 F. 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1912)
(holding that to be liable for trademark infringement, the defendant must affix
the mark to his merchandise); Augstein v. Saks, 69 F. Supp. 547, 549 (N.D. Ca.
1946) ("Infringement of a trade-mark consists of the unauthorized use of an
identical mark, or a colorable imitation of a mark which has already been
appropriated by another, by affixing such a mark to goods of the same or a
similar class."); Thomas A. Edison, Inc., v. Shotkin, 69 F. Supp. 176, 179 (D.
Colo. 1946), appeal dismissed, 163 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 813 (1947); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Netter, 102 F. 691, 692 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1900) (finding no cause of action for trademark infringement because the
defendant had "not affixed the trade-mark complained of to any 'merchandise");
Air-Brush Mfg. Co. v. Thayer, 84 F. 640, 641 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897) (finding no
cause of action for trademark infringement because defendants had not "affixed
complainant's registered mark to merchandise").
90. See Trade-Mark Act of 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502; Trade-Mark Act of
1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat 724; Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533.
91. See Trade-Mark Act of 1881 § 7: "[any person who shall reproduce,
counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any trade-mark registered under this act
916 [Vol. 43
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it was generally understood that these early trademark acts only
codified the common law rights of trademark owners and made no
attempt at substantive alterations.9 2 Indeed, it was widely believed
at the time that Congress had no authority to enact substantive
and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive
properties as those described in the registration, shall be liable ......
Trade-Mark Act of 1905 § 16:
"[any person who shall, without the consent of the owner thereof,
reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such trademark
and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same
descriptive properties as those set forth in the registration, or to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended to be
used upon or in connection with the sale of merchandise of
substantially the same descriptive properties as those set forth in
such registration, and shall use, or shall have used, such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation in commerce among the
several States, or with a foreign nation, or with the Indian tribes,
shall be liable .... ;
Trade-Mark Act of 1920 § 4:
"[any person who shall without the consent of the owner thereof
reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any trademark on
the register provided by this Act, and shall affix the same to
merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those
set forth in the registration, or to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, or receptacles intended to be used upon or in connection
with the sale of merchandise of substantially the same descriptive
properties as those set forth in such registration, and shall use, or
shall have used, such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation in commerce among the several States, or with a foreign
nation, or with the Indian tribes, shall be liable .. "
92. See E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 518
(6th Cir. 1943); Dwinell-Wright Co., 129 F.2d at 851 ("Registration of a trade-
mark under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 neither enlarges nor abridges the
registrant's substantive common-law rights in the mark. The [Act], without
changing the substantive law of trade-marks, provided . . . for the registration
of marks. .. which, without the statute, would be entitled to legal and equitable
protection."); CALLMANN, supra, note 66, § 97.3(a), at 1670-73; 1 NIMS, supra,
note 49, § 185, at 511; Bartholomew Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of
Trade-Marks, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 200, 202 (1949) ("The benefits of [the
1905 Trademark] Act were procedural only, and the nature and scope of the
right in a registered trade-mark remained a common-law... [right] in all trade-
marks, whether registered or unregistered.").
Random perusal of contemporary state trademark registration statutes
reveals language that is similar to the "defendant affixation" language in the
Federal Acts. See, e.g., Arkansas Stats., ch. CL, § 7352 (1883) ("affixation"
required for infringement of state-registered marks); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4904
(1902) ("affixation" required for infringement of state-registered marks);
Indiana Stats. § 8685 (1901) (prohibiting use of mark "upon" similar goods);
Main Rev. Stat., ch. 39, § 41 (1905) ("affixation" on similar goods required for
infringement of state-registered mark); Mo. Rev. Stats. ch. 169, §10366 (1899)
(defendant's "affixation" required to infringe).
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regulation of marks.9 Presumably, then, the affixation limitation
originated in the common law.94
One finds little substantive discussion of the origin and purpose
of the defendant affixation requirement either in the judicial
decisions or in the legal treatises. It seems to be taken as a given.
The limitation flows naturally and logically from the limited
purposes of trademark law and the courts' undertaking to balance
the conflicting interests in prohibiting consumer deception, on the
one hand, and ensuring competitors' free access to language, on the
other. Imposing a "defendant affixation" requirement ensures that
the defendant made a source-indicating, or "trademark use," of the
plaintiffs mark, and thus clearly threatened to deceive consumers.9'
93. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 55 F.2d 455, 459
(C.C.P.A. 1932); CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 97.2, at 1668-70; Derenberg, supra
note 39, at 288 ("[T]he Act of 1905 was based on the theory that the Federal
Government could not under the commerce clause of the Constitution enact
legislation granting substantive statutory rights to the owner of a trade-
mark.").
94. Cf Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 762 (noting that it "is
difficult to discover the basis of the [defendant affixation] rule, although the
indecisive wording of the English and the early [U.S.] Federal statutes may be
partly responsible"). If, for some reason, Congress misunderstood the common
law requirements for technical trademarks in drafting its statutory language,
the practical effect likely was to introduce the affixation requirement into the
common law.
95. Professors Dinwoodie and Janis have argued that requiring affixation
of a mark to goods is not equivalent to requiring "trademark use." Dinwoodie &
Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1614-16. They point out that it would be
possible to attach a mark to a product or its packaging in a manner that does
not signal source to consumers, because, perhaps, it is too small for the
consumers to see, or otherwise is clearly present for some purpose other than
indicating source. This argument is technical, at best. In both the acquisition
of rights and the defendant infringement context, the courts and Congress
clearly intended that the "affixation" requirement would limit rights in
trademarks to the purpose for which the rights were given. Congress and the
courts repeatedly stressed that trademark rights are not broad property rights,
like copyrights or patents. The only legal significance of a trademark lies in its
role in indicating the source of products or services to consumers. Trademark
rights are limited to trademark use-use to indicate source. See, e.g., S. Rep.
No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-17 (1946); United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust
Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1982). The affixation language, in
the infringement context, assures a close association between the defendant's
mark and the goods the defendant is offering for sale. As a general matter, the
close association will lead consumers to rely on the technical trademark for
information about the source of the defendant's goods. That, in turn, will make
it possible for consumers to be deceived about the source of goods, due to
similarities in the plaintiffs and defendant's marks. If a defendant were to
place a tiny mark on its product that would not be noticed, a court would
[Vol. 43
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Affixing a mark to an article of merchandise being offered for sale is
the clearest form of source-indicating use. Of course, there are other
ways that a defendant might use a mark "as a trademark" to
indicate product source-for example, by incorporating the
plaintiffs mark into its business name, or employing it in price lists
or sales documents, or in advertising. Affixation (when defined
strictly as physical placement of a mark on goods) may be viewed as
the "core" of trademark use, but it is a significantly narrower
concept than "trademark use."
Why would courts wish to limit technical trademark
infringement to this narrow subset of trademark uses? One possible
answer relates back to the presumptions that courts incorporated
into technical trademark infringement-presumptions of fraudulent
intent on the defendant's part, presumptions about consumer
confusion. Because those presumptions made it easier to prevail in
a technical trademark infringement case, courts may have wanted
to restrict the cause of action to the clearest cases of unauthorized
trademark use, where there could be little doubt about the likely
impact of the defendant's actions. Trademark owners could always
resort to an unfair competition cause of action against non-affixing
defendants, if they were able to meet the higher burden of proof.
The rule might also represent a response to concerns that broad
trademark rights enable monopolies-a concern that was frequently
voiced in the literature during that time.96
As noted above, the unfair competition cause of action did not
require that the defendant "affix" an allegedly infringing mark or
trade name to its goods.97 However, as I will discuss in the next
probably find that the application was insufficient to constitute "affixation" or
that, under the circumstances, the affixation caused no likelihood of confusion.
It is logical that the courts and Congress would intend the affixation
language to restrict technical trademark infringement liability to defendants
making a clear "trademark use" of the mark, because (as Dinwoodie and Janis
acknowledge) non-trademark uses are unlikely to lead to serious consumer
confusion. It is not logical to assume that Congress or the courts required
affixation as an end in itself.
96. See, e.g., Peter H. Behrendt, Trademarks and Monopolies-Historical
and Conceptual Foundations, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 853, 860 (1961); Bone, supra
note 53, at 589-92, 599-602; Handler & Pickett I, supra, note 47, at 170-71;
Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38
N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5).
97. See, e.g., Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 F. 514, 517-19 (7th Cir.
1904) (defendant's advertising of plaintiffs mark in connection with another
producer's goods and filling orders for plaintiffs goods with other producer's
goods constituted unfair competition); Collier v. Jones, 120 N.Y.S. 991, 992
(Sup. Ct. 1910) (holding defendant's use of trade name similar to plaintiffs in
advertisement constituted unfair competition); Atlas Assur. Co. v. Atlas Ins.
20081
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subsection, lawyers and judges at that time clearly understood the
unfair competition secondary meaning mark infringement cause of
action to be limited to a defendant's "trademark or trade name uses"
of words and symbols and saw this as a distinct element of that
cause of action, apart from the likelihood of confusion issue.9"
The distinction to be drawn between technical trademark
infringement and secondary meaning mark infringement at the turn
of the century thus was not "affixation vs. no trademark use
limitation," but rather "affixation vs. general trademark use," or
"narrow, technical trademark use vs. wider, non-technical
trademark use limitation."99
While the contemporary commentators did not devote a great
deal of attention to the technical trademark infringement
"defendant affixation" requirement, they were critical of the early
versions of it.'00 However, it is important to note that the early
"affixation" requirement broadened over time. This is evidenced in
the language of the federal registration statutes. While the 1870
and 1881 Trademark Acts required that the defendant "affix" the
mark to its merchandise,'1' the 1905 and 1920 Acts provided that it
would infringe to "affix" the mark to merchandise or "to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended to be used
upon or in connection with the sale of merchandise." °2 (As noted
earlier, I call the 1905 and 1920 Act versions the "affixation or other
close association" requirement). Case decisions applying the 1905
Act infringement provision construed this language even more
Co., 112 N.W. 232, 233 (Iowa 1907) (claiming that to limit protection to uses in
connection with manufactured articles of commerce would "leave large financial
interests engaged in other lines of business wholly without the protection of the
court"); Manitowoc Malting Co. v. Milwaukee Malting Co., 97 N.W. 389, 390
(Wisc. 1903) (finding unfair competition when defendant used trade name
similar to plaintiffs on sample cans, bill heads, cards and letterhead).
98. See infra Subsection B, notes 107-10 and accompanying text. As
defined in the Restatement of Torts section 727, "trademark use" and "trade
name use" were essentially the same thing. See infra note 106.
99. That may explain why courts and commentators devoted relatively
little attention to the "defendant affixation" difference between the two causes
of action-it was not a stark difference, but a more modest difference of degree.
100. See, e.g., CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 98.6, at 1698 (characterizing the
defendant affixation requirement as "fallacious" and "manifestly obsolete");
Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 762 (characterizing defendant affixation
requirement as "hypertechnical").
101. Trade-Mark Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 79, 16 Stat. 198, 211; Trade-Mark
Act of 1881, ch. 138, § 7, 21 Stat. 502, 503-04.
102. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (emphasis
added); Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 4, 41 Stat. 533, 534 (emphasis
added).
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broadly, finding that a defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark in
advertising would also constitute infringement.' These
developments led one set of commentators to suggest that technical
trademark infringement no longer required defendant affixation, as
such.' What began as a narrow "affixation" requirement had
evolved into a broader, more generous "trademark use" requirement.
It is useful to note, as well, that the 1905 Act and subsequent
federal pre-Lanham Act provisions permitted certain secondary
meaning marks to be federally registered, and when they were,
federal courts extended the same infringement rules to them as for
technical trademarks, defendant "affixation or other close
association" requirement, and all.'
103. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber
Co., 153 F.2d 662, 666-67 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 722 (1946)
(emphasis added):
[The lower court] assumed, without discussion, that the display of
plaintiffs registered mark in defendant's advertising would constitute
an infringement under 15 U.S.C.A. § 96. We think that assumption is
correct, though the precedents are not so clear as they might be.
Some cases have held that, to come within the Trade-Mark Act,
defendant's accused mark must in some way be impressed upon or
affixed to the goods or the wrapper or container thereof.... We agree
with Sanborn, J., dissenting, in the Diederich case ... that however
much such holding may have been justified under the earlier versions
of the Trade-Mark Act, the broader language of the present Act does
not require any such limited view....
The use of a copy or colorable imitation of plaintiffs trade-mark
in an advertisement of defendant's product might well amount to
affixing said mark "to labels, signs, (or) prints," intended to be used
"in connection with the sale of merchandise" within the meaning of
the Act. . . . Manifestly the essential wrong of trade-mark
infringement, the appropriation of the good will of another's
established mark, may be effectively accomplished by advertising
matter associating that other's distinguishing mark with the product
of defendant.
See also Hygienic Prods. Co. v. Judson Dunaway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 935, 943-44
(D.N.H. 1948), vacated, 178 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 948
(1950) ("The protection which is to be accorded the legal owner of a valid trade-
mark extends beyond the sole use thereof in the marketing of his product by
various forms of container merchandising. Even though the statute does not
include the term 'advertising,' it has been construed that 'signs' and 'prints'
used in advertising constitute a use of such material 'in connection with the sale
of merchandise.' There is ample authority to the effect that leaflets, display
cards, and newspaper advertising will support a claim of infringement.")
104. Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 762-63.
105. Trade-Mark Act of 1905 § 5. Federal registration had been limited to
technical trademarks, but the "ten-year clause" of the 1905 Act permitted
secondary meaning marks to be registered if they had been used exclusively for
a period of ten years preceding 1905. The apparent reasoning was that marks
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As will be discussed in more depth in the next subsection, the
Restatement of Torts, published in 1938, found that any remaining
distinction between the elements of trademark infringement and
secondary meaning mark infringement was no longer meaningful.
It provided that plaintiffs in both trademark and trade name
infringement claims must demonstrate that the defendant used its
indication of origin "in the manner of a trade-mark or trade
name."
106
B. The Trademark Use Requirement in the Law of Unfair
Competition
We have seen how technical trademark infringement required
trademark use in the form of an "affixation" requirement that
gradually expanded to include application of a mark not only to the
defendant's merchandise, itself, but also to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended to be used "on or in
connection with the sale" of that merchandise and in advertising the
merchandise. We have further noted that, under the 1905 Act's ten-
year clause, some secondary meaning marks were registered and
thus brought under the same infringement prerequisite. It remains
that were not inherently distinctive, but had been in exclusive use for ten or
more years could be presumed to have acquired secondary meaning and thus
could be equated to technical trademarks in function and interest. See
CALLMANN, supra note 66 at § 98.7, at 1701-02; 2 NIMS, supra note 49, § 229(a),
at 790; Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 783-84.
In Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Manufacturing Co., 233 U.S. 461
(1914), the Supreme Court held that while registered secondary meaning marks
could still be used in their primary meaning, the registrant of a secondary
meaning mark under the ten-year rule would not be required to "show wrongful
intent in fact on the part of the defendant, or facts justifying the inference of
such an intent" as it would have been required to do in the case of an
unregistered secondary meaning mark. Id. at 471. According to the Court,
"[tihe applicant, who by virtue of actual and exclusive use is entitled to register
his mark under [the ten-year] clause, becomes on due registration the 'owner' of
a 'trade-mark' within the meaning of the [1905] [Alct, and he is entitled to be
protected in its use as such." Id. at 469.
Thus, the expanded statutory defendant "affixation or other close
association" requirement would also apply to registered secondary meaning
marks, although (as noted above), the 1905 Act's expanded affixation
requirement, as construed by the courts, now roughly stated a more general
"trademark use" requirement. And as discussed in the next section, a more
general "trademark use or trade name use" requirement would have applied in
common law unfair competition cases, anyway.
106. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 717, 727 (1938). Under section 727, one uses
a designation of origin "in the manner of a trade-mark or trade name ... if he so
uses it . . .as the name of, or the means of identifying, his goods, services, or
business." Id. § 727.
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to be discussed the extent to which (during the roughly fifty years
leading up to enactment of the Lanham Act) the common law of
unfair competition subjected secondary meaning mark infringement
claims to a similar "defendant trademark use" requirement.
There are several grounds on which to demonstrate that the
common law of unfair competition did, in fact, limit the cause of
action for secondary meaning mark infringement to a defendant's
trademark or trade name use. First, that limitation can be inferred
from the rule that businesses could only assert rights in a mark's
secondary (source-indicating) meaning, and not in its primary
(descriptive, geographical, surname, or common) meaning:' °7
infringement would only be found when the defendant used the
plaintiffs mark name in its secondary meaning--as an indication of
source, rather than in its original descriptive, geographic, surname,
or other meaning."' 8 This is an implicit trademark use requirement.
A trademark use limitation might also be inferred from the lack
of discussion in the case law and literature about the technical
trademark "affixation" requirement. 109 On the face of it, one might
expect that courts, and particularly commentators, would have more
to say about the fact that technical trademark infringement
107. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
108. See CALLMANN, supra note 66, §§ 85.1-85.1(a), at 1352-53 ("Trademark
use is that use which is patently purposed at calling the public's attention to the
symbol of the advertised article. The purchaser is thus advised that the article
bearing that mark is the same as that with which he has already become
familiar; he is also assured thereby that any article so trade-marked will be
similar to the article he previously bought. Non-trade-mark use, on the other
hand, is that use which is designed to inform the public that the article is of a
particular quality or [geographic] origin .... [TIhe defendant shall not be
deprived of the use of a descriptive word 'in a primary sense.., it is within the
court's province to determine whether the particular usage is referable to its
primary or secondary sense."); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair
Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 318-
19 (1979) ("[A] trademark did not give a monopoly in language that would allow
the owner to prevent the ordinary use of the word, . . .the only right of the
trademark owner was to prevent use of the word as the trademark of another
manufacturer's goods."); see also Handler & Pickett I, supra note 47, at 170-71
(arguing that only trademark uses of words and symbols will infringe and that
a trademark use occurs when the word or symbol is "employed to denominate or
designate a definite species of commodity or a particular business" and is "used
commercially"); id. at 184 ("When it is said that a word is used as a mark, what
is meant, among other things, is that it is being used as a name for the product
of a given person .... ).
109. Both Dinwoodie & Janis and McKenna remark on the dearth of
discussion about the "affixation" requirement for technical trademark
infringement. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1618-19;
McKenna, supra note 25 (manuscript at 20-22).
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required affixation, or "affixation or other close association," while
secondary meaning mark infringement did not. Yet, one finds very
little on the subject. Rather, one finds repeated comments to the
effect that the important (and by implication, only noteworthy)
difference between the two causes of action was the requirement
that trade name plaintiffs demonstrate the defendant's fraudulent
intent." ° Why did courts and commentators not take greater note of
the "defendant affixation" difference? The likely explanation is that
there really was no significant difference, as the technical trademark
affixation requirement was relaxed to include not just placement on
products, but also use on labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, and in advertising of the defendant's products. As
expanded, the technical trademark "affixation or other close
association" requirement did not pose a significantly greater
limitation on the plaintiffs rights than already existed under the
law of unfair competition. Handler and Pickett stated as much in
1930, when they commented that the Trademark Act of 1905's
expansion of the affixation requirement appeared to extinguish the
distinction between technical trademarks and secondary meaning
marks on this issue."'
Review of the unfair competition decisions themselves affirms
that courts only recognized liability for "trademark or trade name
uses" of words and symbols. Contemporary treatise commentators
divided unfair competition cases into predictable categories:
defendants incorporating allegedly infringing words or symbols into
their business names (that generally were prominently displayed on,
in, or in close proximity to their shop);" 2 defendants placing and
emphasizing confusingly similar words or symbols on their products
110. See HOPKINS, supra note 49, § 19, at 45-46 (stating that with the
exception of the fraud rule, "the same general rules of law and procedure
prevail" in both unfair competition and trademark infringement cases); Chafee,
Jr., supra note 50, at 1296-97, 1301 (noting the uniformity of the law governing
technical trademark infringement and unfair competition); Handler & Pickett
II, supra note 59, at 787-88 (Distinctions stated by courts to exist between
technical trademark and secondary meaning mark infringement find little
support in the actual decisions. Amalgamation of the law of technical
trademark and trade name infringement is well underway, even without the
assistance of legislation.).
111. Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 763.
112. Contrary to the suggestion in Dinwoodie and Janis, Confusion, supra
note 24, at 1627-28, use of a word or symbol in a business name could be
deemed an infringing trademark use, for purposes of unfair competition law,
because it signified product or service source, closely associating the contested
word or symbol with goods or services the user is offering for sale. See
CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 85.1(a), at 1354; 1 NIMS, supra note 49, § 221(n), at
724.
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or product packaging; defendants displaying allegedly infringing
words or symbols on business-related papers, such as letterhead,
price lists, and cards; defendants displaying allegedly infringing
words or symbols in circulars and advertisements113 -all for the
purpose of indicating the source of their own business, products, or
services."' One finds no cases recognizing "in gross" rights in words
or symbols-only rights against a defendant's close association of an
allegedly infringing word or symbol with goods or services it is
offering for sale, or with its business as a whole. 15
The legal scholarship of that time more expressly recognized a
trademark or trade name use limitation-in unfair
competition/secondary meaning mark infringement, as well as
technical trademark infringement cases-in the course of
addressing the potential anticompetitive effects of trademarks. For
example, Milton Handler and Charles Pickett, in their duo of 1930
Columbia Law Review articles, extensively surveyed the U.S. case
law and concluded that both forms of mark infringement were
limited to cases in which the defendant makes a "trademark use," as
113. See, e.g., CALLMANN, supra note 66, ch. 21; HOPKINS, supra note 49, at
277-80; 1 NIMS, supra note 49, ch. XV-A, at 667; WILLIAM HENRY BROWN, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS §§ 528-529,
531-533, 535-538, 541 (2d ed. 1898).
114. See 1 NIMS, supra note 49, § 221(m), at 723-24 (noting the alignment of
the common law and the federal trademark act in this regard).
115. The only category of decisions that catches the eye as arguably
involving non-trademark uses are the cases in which consumers enter a shop
asking for brand X, and the merchant gives them brand Y instead. See 1 NIMS,
supra note 49, § 221(o), at 725. In these cases, the merchant may not visually
associate the contested word or symbol with the product and may not even
speak the plaintiffs word or symbol to the customer. However, courts were
careful to explain that this situation did, in fact, approximate trademark use
and constitute an indication of product source. As one court put it, such actions
constitute an assertion by the merchant that the product it is providing is the
product that was requested:
If acts speak louder than words, then this assertion [is] more positive
and emphatic than if it had been spoken aloud. The result is that an
article manufactured by A. has been successfully palmed off upon an
innocent purchaser as an article manufactured by B., and as the
article for which the purchaser made inquiry; and this has been
accomplished by a deception arising from and based upon what must
be held to be an unlawful use of a trade-mark or word-symbol.
Enoch Morgan's Sons Co. v. Wendover, 43 F. 420, 421 (D.N.J. 1890). It would
be better to resolve this kind of case through the "fraudulent marketing" or
"passing off' causes of action described in the Restatement of Torts and the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, as described in the next subsection,
infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text. Those causes of action rest on
misrepresentations about product source that do not entail an unauthorized use
of the plaintiffs mark or trade name.
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opposed to a descriptive, or "non-trademark" use. 116 They defined
"trademark use," for this purpose, as involving two things: (1) "[tlhe
word must be employed to denominate or designate a definite
species of commodity or a particular business"; and (2) "the mark
[must] be used commercially."
1 7
In discussing the requirement that the defendant's use be
denominative, the authors explained that: "Affixation of the word to
an article . . . is unnecessary. 'Kodak' stamped upon a camera,
'Kodak' used as the flare-head in an advertisement of the same
article, 'Kodak' in a price-list enumerating different brands of
cameras, are all examples of denominative uses of the term
'Kodak.''1 8 These examples of "denominative" use are consistent
with the "affixation or other close association" requirement of
technical trademark law.
In undertaking to restate the law of trademarks and unfair
competition as it existed just eight years later, the American Law
Institute clearly recognized "use in the manner of a trade-mark or
trade name" as a separate element in both the cause of action for
technical trademark infringement and the unfair competition cause
of action for secondary meaning mark infringement." The
accompanying comments explained:
A person having a trade-mark or trade name does not have the
exclusive right to use the designation which constitutes the
116. Handler & Pickett I, supra note 47, at 170. Specifically, they described
two possible uses of word marks, which they called "use as a mark, or trade-
mark use," and "descriptive use or use in a non-trademark sense." Id.
117. Id. at 170-71.
118. Id. at 170.
119. Section 717(1) provided a "general statement of conditions" necessary
for infringement. With regard to a trade name (which includes a secondary
meaning mark), the Restatement found infringement by an actor if:
(a) without a privilege to do so, he uses in his business, in the
manner of a trade-mark or trade name, a designation which is
identical with or confusingly similar to the other's trade
name, though he does not use the designation for the purpose
of deception, and
(b) the other's interest in his trade name is protected with
reference to
(i) the goods, services or business in connection with
which the actor uses his designation, and
(ii) the markets in which the actor uses his designation.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 717(1) (1938) (emphasis added). Section 717 then
stated that one infringes a trademark if the same conditions for infringing a
trade name were satisfied, the other had affixed his mark to the goods before
the actor, and the other's trademark was not a clear likeness of a third person's
prior and subsisting trademark in substantially the same market for the same
or clearly related goods. Id. § 717(2).
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trade-mark or trade name. He has only the exclusive right,
subject to the limitations stated in [section 717], to use the
designation in commerce for particular purposes.... It is only
when the designation is used by others in such a manner as to
appear to denominate their goods, services or business to
prospective customers that infringement may result.
120
The Restatement of Torts section 727 provided the official
definition of this "use in the manner of a trademark or trade name"
element of the infringement cause of action: "One uses a designation
in the manner of a trade-mark or trade name, under the rule stated
in § 717, if he so uses it that prospective purchasers are likely to
regard it as the name of, or the means of identifying, his goods,
,,121
services or business.
Comment b explained that one may use a designation in the
manner of a trademark or trade name:
[W]hether he affixes the designation to goods or otherwise uses
it in such a way as to convey the impression to prospective
purchasers that it identifies his goods, services or business.
This impression he may give by using the designation in
various ways such as in his advertising, or on his signs or
letterheads, or in his correspondence or speech, or even by
non-verbal conduct. Thus if a prospective purchaser, pointing
to a box of soap, asks the actor, "Is this the 'Ridge' brand?" and
the actor replies "Yes," the actor is using the word "Ridge,"
under the rule stated in this Section, just as if he had placed
over the box a sign reading "Ridge Soap." 22
Comment c stressed that under this definition of trademark and
trade name use, "the likelihood that prospective purchasers will
regard the use of the designation in the manner stated must be
substantial. That there is a very remote possibility that prospective
purchasers generally will so regard the use is not enough. "123 Thus,
while the Restatement's definition of "use in the manner of a
trademark or trade name" is not as exacting or succinct as the
"affixation or other close association" requirement, as codified in the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, both sources describe essentially the same
conceptual limitation to the infringement cause of action.
The Restatement of Torts treated the question of whether the
120. Id. § 717 cmt. c (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 727 (emphasis added). Comment a elaborated that:
The right of a person having a trade-mark or trade name is not to the
exclusive use of the designation in all circumstances, but only to its
exclusive use for the performance of the functions of a trade-mark ....
Other persons may use the designation if their use does not involve a
performance of those functions.
122. Id. § 727 cmt. b (emphasis added).
123. Id. § 727 cmt. c (emphasis added).
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defendant's mark was "confusingly similar" to the plaintiffs as a
completely separate inquiry. 124 Thus, as described by the
Restatement of Torts, less than ten years before the Lanham Act
was enacted, the common law had come to view secondary meaning
marks and trademarks as performing essentially the same function
in essentially the same way, and thus entitled them to essentially
the same protection. 25 The only important remaining difference was
that the law defined ownership and priority in secondary meaning
marks by means of secondary meaning, as it continues to do today.
The Restatement recognized that, as a practical matter, the
case law no longer imposed a meaningful requirement of fraudulent
intent in trade name infringement claims, and thus explicitly stated
that infringement could be found, in both technical trademark and
unfair competition cases, even if the defendant "does not use the
designation for the purpose of deception."26
To summarize, the Restatement expressly recognized a separate
and distinct "defendant use in the manner of a trademark or trade
name" requirement for both trademark and secondary meaning
mark infringement causes of action. 127 This "trademark/trade name
use" requirement was separate from the "confusingly similar" issue.
The Restatement's definition of "use in the manner of a trade-mark
or trade name" was stated more generally than the "affixation or
other close association" standard of the Trademark Acts of 1905 and
1920, but was nonetheless clearly conceptually consistent with that
statutory limitation. Given the Restatement's requirement of a
substantial likelihood that consumers would understand the
defendant's use to indicate source, and the flexibility courts had
demonstrated in construing the 1905 and 1920 Acts' language, any
substantive differences were likely to be quite minor.
12
124. Id. §§ 728-731. Section 728 defines "confusingly similar," providing
that a designation "is confusingly similar to a trade-mark or trade name under
the rule stated in section 717 if prospective purchasers are likely to regard it as
indicating the source identified by the trade-mark or trade name." Id. § 728.
125. Accord Bartholomew, supra note 96 (manuscript at 15); Chafee, supra
note 50, at 1296-1301; Handler & Pickett I & II, supra notes 47 & 59, passim;
see id. § 717 cmt. a (discussing similar functions).
126. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 717(1)(a).
127. See, for example, Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of California, Ltd., 60
F. Supp. 442, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1945): To demonstrate infringement of either a
trade mark or a trade name, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
used a designation in the manner of a trademark or a trade name, that is, that
he used it so that prospective purchasers are likely to regard it as the name of,
or means of identifying his goods, services or business. This showing must be
made regardless of whether the plaintiffs mark is registered or unregistered.
128. This understanding regarding trademark use is carried forward in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, though with less fanfare. The
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C. Liability in the Absence of Trademark Use: Fraudulent
Marketing
In recognizing this "trademark use" limitation on trademark
and secondary meaning mark infringement causes of action, the
Restatement noted that liability for causing "confusion of source"
might be imposed in some cases in which the defendant made no use
of a mark or trade name at all. First, it recognized indirect
infringement causes of action for inducing one's purchasers to
infringe on resale 129 and for contributory infringement. 1 3 0  These
causes of action, of course, would only be available when the
defendant's actions led to trademark use and direct infringement by
a third party. Second, the Restatement recognized an additional
cause of action that it described under the separate title,
"Fraudulent Marketing."'
31
The "fraudulent marketing" cause of action addressed
fraudulent misrepresentations that an actor might make in the
course of marketing his goods: to suggest that he is the plaintiff or
the plaintiffs agent or successor; to suggest that his goods are
produced, processed, designed, or distributed by the plaintiff; or to
suggest that his services are those rendered by the plaintiff.
1 32
Liability under this section might be imposed even if the defendant
made no reference to the plaintiffs mark or trade name at all. To
state a cause of action for fraudulent marketing, the plaintiff must
Restatement (Third), section 20, comment b specifies that: "An actor is subject
to liability for infringement only if it uses another's mark or name in identifying
the actor's own goods, services, or business .... This Section does not apply to
the use of another's protected designation for other purposes." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20, cmt. b (1995) (emphasis added).
129. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 738 (1938).
130. Id. § 739.
131. Id. §§ 712-714. The Restatement also recognized, under a separate
subtitle, a very limited cause of action that it called "Imitation of Appearance,"
which was the forerunner of today's product feature trade dress infringement
cause of action. Id. §§ 741-743. The Restatement's definition of this cause of
action was narrowly circumscribed by the functionality doctrine, as set forth in
section 742. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the courts
moved away from the Restatement's conservative definition of functionality,
tending to shrink the concept of functionality and thus to greatly expand
protection of the appearance of products and product features. See, e.g., In re
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In 2001, the
Supreme Court essentially directed lower courts to revert to the earlier
Restatement of Torts section 742 definition of functionality. TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-35 (2001); see Margreth
Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality:
Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 110-37
(2004).
132. RESTATEMENT OFTORTS § 712.
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demonstrate: (1) that the defendant made a fraudulent
misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing persons to purchase
the goods or services he was marketing; and (2) that the
circumstances were such that his audience was likely to rely on the
misrepresentation, to the commercial detriment of the plaintiff. "'
The key to the fraudulent marketing cause of action was that
(unlike the related trademark infringement and unfair competition
causes of action) it retained its "fraudulent intent" requirement.
Moreover, the Restatement stressed that the cause of action
required a showing of genuine fraudulent intent, specifying that a
section 712 misrepresentation would be deemed fraudulent under
the circumstances set forth under Restatement of Torts sections
526-29, which defined the general business tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation. 1
34
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recognizes a
form of this fraudulent marketing cause of action (which it calls
"passing off') that is available even without a showing of fraudulent
intent. However, the Restatement (Third) expressly excludes from
this cause of action misrepresentations that merely consist of the
unauthorized application of a mark."'
133. Id.
134. Id. § 712 cmt. b. Under those provisions, a misrepresentation will be
deemed fraudulent if the maker:
(1) knows or believes the matter to be otherwise than as represented;
or
(2) knows that he has not the confidence in its existence or non-
existence asserted by his statement of knowledge or belief, or
(3) knows that he has not the basis for his knowledge or belief
professed by his assertion.
135. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides a chapter,
apart from its chapter on trademarks, entitled "Deceptive Marketing." There it
provides causes of action for a range of non-trademark-related
misrepresentations that a defendant might make about its own products or
services. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2-8 (1995). In
particular, the Restatement (Third) describes a cause of action for "Passing Off'
at section 4, against a defendant who:
in connection with the marketing of goods or services, makes a
representation likely to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers by
causing the mistaken belief that the [defendant's] business is the
business of the [plaintiff], or that the [defendant] is the agent, affiliate,
or associate of the [plaintiff], or that the goods or services that the
[defendant] markets are produced, sponsored, or approved by the
[plaintiff].
Id. § 4 (emphasis added).
Unlike its "fraudulent marketing" predecessor in Restatement of Torts
section 712, this provision recognizes liability even absent a showing of
fraudulent intent. Id. § 4 cmt. d. It merely requires: (1) a misrepresentation, in
the course of marketing goods or services, about the defendant's own goods or
services or commercial activities; (2) that is likely to deceive or mislead
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In cases alleging misrepresentation by virtue of the
unauthorized use of a mark, relief must be sought under the specific
rules of trademark infringement."6  Thus, Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition section 4 may give relief against
misrepresentations that cause source confusion, without a showing
of trademark use or fraudulent intent, but the plaintiff must
demonstrate the defendant's specific act of misrepresentation that
does not merely consist of the unauthorized application of a mark."7
Professors Dinwoodie and Janis have argued that, in order to
police a range of dishonest marketplace conduct in new technological
settings such as the Internet, courts must be able to apply
trademark infringement law without the limitations posed by the
trademark use requirement. 138 However, the fraudulent marketing
and deceptive marketing/passing off causes of action described in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition seem well constituted to police such dishonest
conduct without converting trademark rights into rights in gross in
words and symbols, which is essentially what sacrifice of the
prospective purchasers: and (3) is likely to cause commercial detriment to the
plaintiff. See id. §§ 2-4. The cause of action is limited to commercial speech.
Id. § 2 cmt. a.
136. Id. § 4 cmt. b. Comment b expressly provides that if "a
misrepresentation of source or sponsorship arises solely from the unauthorized
use of a trademark or other indicia of identification, relief must be sought"
under the specific rules of trademark infringement, rather than under the
section 4 passing off provisions. Accord Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th
Cir. 2002) ("[A] claim of unfair competition, unlike a claim of trademark
infringement, does not require that a defendant use the plaintiffs trademark.").
However, when the plaintiffs allegations "relate to the defendant's alleged use
of his trademark, rather than any other actions that might have misled the
public," the claim will fail unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
defendant "actually used [the plaintiffs mark] in a prohibited manner." Id.
137. It is also useful to note that Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
section 5 characterizes a cause of action for reverse passing off as one for
"deceptive marketing," rather than trademark infringement, and permits
recovery when a defendant
in marketing goods or services manufactured, produced, or supplied
by the [plaintiff,] . . . makes a representation likely to deceive or
mislead prospective purchasers by causing the mistaken belief that
the [defendant] or a third person is the manufacturer, producer, or
supplier of the goods or services if the representation is to the likely
commercial detriment of the [plaintiff].
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5. This cause of action appears
to address and resolve Professor McKenna's concern that recognition of the
trademark use requirement will "rule out actions for reverse passing off under
the Lanham Act." McKenna, supra note 25 (manuscript at 33).
138. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1636.
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trademark use requirement would entail in many instances.
139
Courts have often construed Lanham Act section 43(a) to provide
redress against a defendant's deceptive statements or conduct,
without implicating trademark rights.
140
II. LOCATING "TRADEMARK USE" IN THE LANHAM ACT
We have reviewed the development of the common-law
trademark and unfair competition doctrines, and have pinpointed
the state in which these doctrines stood in the late 1930s and early
1940s, when Congress drafted the Lanham Act. This information is
crucial to construe the Lanham Act, since Congress intended for the
Act primarily to codify existing common law doctrine.4 4 However,
139. Other sources have recognized a similar small set of causes of action
that do not constitute trademark or trade name infringement, but nonetheless
may provide relief against certain acts that cause source confusion. See, for
example, 2 NIMS, supra note 49, which sets these "fraudulent marketing" kinds
of claims apart from trademark and trade name infringement by placing them
in a category of "Miscellaneous Forms of Unfair Competition." Id. §§ 284 (Acts
Contributory to Unfair Acts); 294(a) (Use of Falsehood with Respect to Agency
or Succession); 296(a) (Sale of Used or Altered Goods as New); 297 (Sale of
Inferior Goods, or Seconds, as Usual Quality); 297(c) (Misrepresentation of a
Competitor's Goods as One's Own).
140. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.
23, 29, 32 (2003) (holding that section 43(a) extends beyond protection of
trademarks and prohibits acts other than unauthorized use of trademarks that
deceive consumers about product source); Schlotzksy's, Ltd. v. Sterling
Purchasing & Nat'l Distribution Co., 520 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
arguments that Lanham Act section 43(a) relates only to misuse of
trademarks); Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The
existence of a trademark is not a necessary prerequisite to a § 43(a) action.");
see also Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that common law unfair competition cause of action arose
from defendant's misrepresentation that its folding beds were "original," which
confused consumers, leading them to believe that the beds emanated from
plaintiff, who was the original producer of folding beds).
141. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982)
(White, J., concurring) ("[Tihe purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and
unify the common law of unfair competition and trademark protection."); S.
REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946); 92 CONG. REC. 6, 7524 (1946); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. e ("The Lanham Act is
generally declarative of existing law, incorporating the principal features of
common law trademark protection."); Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's
Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. REV. 233, 246 (1985)
("Federal trademark law is unusual because, although it is created by federal
statute, most of its underlying substance is derived from and is intended to
remain part of state common law."); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of
Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 198-99 (2004) (arguing that the
Lanham Act "adopts and stands for the complete common law development,
representing a complexity of doctrine which would require dozens of pages to
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before turning to the Lanham Act's provisions, it is useful briefly to
consider the earlier federal trademark acts that preceded it, as those
earlier acts also influenced Congress in designing the Act's
provisions.
A. Legislative History-The Earlier Trademark Acts
As noted earlier, the first two federal trademark acts, in 1870
and 1881, defined infringement of a registered mark as affixation of
a reproduction, copy, counterfeit, or colorable imitation of the
plaintiffs registered trademark to goods of "substantially the same
descriptive properties" as those set forth in the registration. 4 2 The
1881 Act also incorporated the common law "affixation" prerequisite
to mark ownership, requiring that the registration applicant
describe the manner in which it had "applied and affixed" the mark
to goods. Neither act defined "affixation." Both acts addressed
only technical trademarks, and the 1881 Act, at least, purported
only to codify the substantive rights provided under the common
law.
44
set forth in full .... What may look on its face like a legislative creation of a
body of rules is in fact nothing more than a cursory legislative recognition of a
long pre-existing body of law developed by courts through the common law
process"); Daniel M. McClure, supra note 108, at 334, 340 (maintaining that the
Lanham Act adopted the substance of existing common law doctrine and court
constructions have not altered it).
142. Trade-Mark Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 79, 16 Stat. 198; Trade-Mark Act of
1881, ch. 138, § 7, 21 Stat. 502. Congress enacted the 1870 Act as part of "[aln
Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to Patents and
Copyrights," and appeared to rely on its powers under the Constitution's
Patents and Copyrights Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, to enact not only
the patent and copyright provisions, but the trademark provisions as well.
Trade-Mark Act of 1870, at 198. The Supreme Court found the 1870 Act and a
related penal provision (Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141, which also
imposed affixation requirements as a prerequisite to violation) unconstitutional
in The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). The Supreme Court found
that Congress lacked constitutional authority to regulate trademarks under the
Patents and Copyrights Clause and that Congress lacked any constitutional
authority to regulate marks not used in interstate or foreign commerce. Id. at
93-96. In an excess of caution, Congress expressly limited the Act of 1881 to
marks used in foreign commerce and in commerce with the Indian Tribes
(omitting marks used in interstate commerce). Trade-Mark Act of 1881 § 1.
While it was undoubtedly constitutional, this Act was too limited in scope to be
much utilized.
143. Trade-Mark Act of 1881 § 1.
144. See Edison v. Thomas A. Edison Jr., Chem. Co., 128 F. 1013, 1014
(C.C.D. Del. 1904); CALLMANN, supra note 66, § 97.1, at 1666. Interestingly, the
1870 Act provided for intent-to-use registration. Trade-Mark Act of 1870 § 77.
After that act was found unconstitutional, this registration option disappeared
from American law until The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. See
20081 933
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The Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905 provided for
registration of both technical trademarks and certain secondary
meaning marks-those that had been in use for ten years prior to
the enactment date.145 Like its predecessor, the 1905 Act was only
understood to codify the common law rights of mark owners and to
provide procedural but no substantive advantages over the common
law.
46
The 1905 Act required that registration applicants provide a
description of the manner in which they had "applied and affixed"
their mark to goods 47 and a declaration that the mark was being
"used in commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, or with Indian tribes.'48 With regard to infringement,
section 16 provided:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner
thereof, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any
such trade-mark and affix the same to merchandise of
substantially the same descriptive properties as those set forth
in the registration, or to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, or receptacles intended to be used upon or in
connection with the sale of merchandise of substantially the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006).
145. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724. Section 5 is
generally known as the "ten-year clause." It was assumed that a mark that was
not inherently distinctive, but had been used exclusively as a trademark for ten
years would have secondary meaning. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Houston Printing
Co., 11 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1926); CALLMANN, supra note 66, §98.7, at 1701-
02. The ten-year clause is the forerunner of present Lanham Act section 2(f).
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). As noted earlier, supra note 105 and accompanying text,
once secondary meaning marks were properly registered under the ten-year
clause, courts subjected them to the same "affixation or other close association"
prerequisite to infringement as it did registered technical trademarks.
Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461, 469 (1914) (holding that
any other interpretation "would render the ten-year proviso meaningless by
stripping it of practical effect"); CALLMANN, supra note 66, §98.7, at 1702-03.
However, protection of common, descriptive, geographically descriptive, and
surname marks under the ten-year clause only went to the word or symbors
trademark, or secondary meaning. Others remained free to use such words and
symbols in their primary meaning. 2 NIMS, supra note 49, § 229(a), at 790.
146. Walgreen Drug Stores, Inc. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F.2d 956,
960 (8th Cir. 1940); Rudolf Callmann, Trade-Mark Infringement and Unfair
Competition, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 202 (1949); Walter J. Derenberg,
The Patent Office as Guardian of the Public Interest in Trade-Mark Registration
Proceedings, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 288, 288 (1949). Unlike the 1881 Act,
the 1905 Act extended to marks "in commerce with foreign nations, or among
the several States, or with Indian tribes." Trade-Mark Act of 1905 § 1.
147. Trade-Mark Act of 1905 § 1.
148. Id. § 2.
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same descriptive properties as those set forth in such
registration, and shall use, or shall have used, such
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation in
commerce among the several States, or with a foreign nation,
or with the Indian tribes, shall be liable .... "9
Thus, the 1905 Act significantly expanded on the earlier acts'
defendant "affixation" requirement, to include a number of other
visible mark uses that were closely associated with the sale of goods
and that were likely to be understood as indicating product source.
While the section 16 infringement definition did not mention use of
marks in the advertising of goods,' 50 courts nonetheless construed
the Act to permit a finding of infringement based on a defendant's
use of the mark in advertising its goods. 5
Section 29, which set forth a series of definitions to be used in
construing the 1905 Act, provided that:
[A] trade-mark shall be deemed to be "affixed" to an article
when it is placed in any manner in or upon either the article
itself or the receptacle or package or upon the envelope or
other thing in, by, or with which the goods are packed or
inclosed or otherwise prepared for sale or distribution.
5 2
Like Lanham Act section 45, which succeeded it, section 29
provided that its definitions must be observed in construing the Act
"except where the contrary intent is plainly apparent from the
context thereof.' 153 This suggests that the 1905 Act's definition of
affixation should be applied to "affixation" both as used in the
registration context and in the infringement context, although one
might argue that defining "affixation" this way for purposes of
infringement would render some of the section 16 language
redundant.
54
The Trade-Mark Act of March 19, 1920115 was the most
important amendment to the 1905 Act. It extended the scope of
trade name registrations under the 1905 Act's ten-year clause,"6
149. Id. § 16 (emphasis added).
150. See supra text accompanying note 149.
151. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co.,
153 F.2d 662, 666-67 (1st Cir. 1946); see note 103, supra, and accompanying
text.
152. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 29, 33 Stat. 724.
153. Id.
154. Section 16 defined "infringement" as affixing a mark to the defendant's
merchandise, "or to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, [and] receptacles
intended to be used" with the defendant's merchandise. Id. § 16.
155. Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533.
156. Id. § 9. The amendment permitted owners of marks registered under
the ten-year clause to extend their registrations to additional products, beyond
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created the predecessor of the Lanham Act's Supplemental
Register, 57 and created the predecessor of the Lanham Act's section
43(a), which provides a cause of action for infringement of
unregistered indications of origin and other acts of unfair
competition.
The 1920 Act's "false designation of origin" provision set forth a
cause of action against any person who "shall willfully and with
intent to deceive, affix, apply, or annex or use in connection with any
article or articles of merchandise, or any container or containers of
the same, a false designation of origin" and cause the merchandise to
1581enter into interstate or foreign commerce.
The 1920 Act provided essentially the same definition of
infringement for marks registered on the new "supplemental
register" as the 1905 Act did for registered marks. 9 Thus, the 1920
Act referred to "affixation" in connection with infringement.
However, it did not use the word "affix" in connection with its
registration provisions.
16 0
At this point it is useful to summarize the state of things in
1938, when Congress began, in earnest, to draft a new,
comprehensive trademark act. First, all the prior federal trademark
acts had expressly defined infringement of marks (and registered
secondary meaning marks) in terms of the defendant's affixation of a
word or symbol to its merchandise (1870 and 1881 Acts), or the
defendant's affixation or other application of the word or symbol in a
manner that closely, visually associated it with its merchandise
(1905 and 1920 Acts). Some-but not all-of the Acts also mandated
"affixation" as a prerequisite to registration of marks. The
those listed in the original registration.
157. The 1920 Act provided for registration of a range of foreign marks and
domestic marks that were otherwise unregisterable under the terms of the 1905
Act, if they had been "in bona fide use for not less than one year" in interstate
or foreign commerce. Id. § 1(b). The purpose of this extension of registration
was to bring the U.S. into compliance with its treaty obligations and to improve
the opportunities for U.S. citizens to register their marks abroad. For further
detail, see 2 Nims, supra note 49, § 224(a), at 737; Callmann, supra note 66, §
98.10, at 1717-21.
158. Trade-Mark Act of 1920 § 3 (emphasis added).
159. Id. § 4. While receiving the right to sue for infringement in federal
court, however, registrants of the 1920 Act's "one-year marks" did not receive a
presumption of ownership the way owners of marks registered under the 1905
Act did. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724.
160. The marks/trade names to be registered under the 1920 Act must have
been "in bona fide use for not less than one year in interstate or foreign
commerce . . . by the proprietor thereof, upon or in connection with" the
proprietor's goods. Trade-Mark Act of 1920 § 1. Section 1 also referred to the
goods to which the mark was "applied." Id.
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American Law Institute had just released its Restatement of Torts,
which recognized that the common law had effectively abandoned
the fraudulent intent requirement in secondary meaning mark
infringement cases, and set forth essentially the same standard of
infringement for both technical trademarks and secondary meaning
marks-a standard that expressly required a defendant's use of the
word or symbol "in the manner of a trademark or trade name."
B. Enactment of the Lanham Act
As the United States progressed further into the twentieth
century, developing a more expansive and sophisticated commercial
economy, pressure mounted from the business sector to modernize
and liberalize trademark law. By the late 1930s and early 1940s,
the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 had been frequently amended and
augmented, resulting in a confusing patchwork of statutory
provisions that needed a general overhaul and clarification.1
61
Congress began this task in 1938162 and succeeded in enacting the
Lanham Act eight years later, in 1946.163
Trademark practitioners, as well as academics, strongly
advocated that the new Act provide more liberal registration
opportunities for service marks and secondary meaning marks'6 and
dispense with the remaining technical distinctions between
161. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5:3, at 5-9 (4th ed. 2008) (enumerating drawbacks and
deficiencies in the 1905 Act that lead to a series of amendments over the years,
eventually resulting in a "crazy quilt of modifications and amendments"); 2
NIMS, supra note 49, § 223(a), at 733 (describing ten amendments to the 1905
Act).
162. For discussion of the early beginnings of the Lanham Act, see 1
McCarthy, supra note 161, § 5:4; Keith M. Stolte, A Response to Jerome Gilson's
Call for an Overhaul of the Lanham Act, 94 Trademark Rep. 1335, 1347-50
(2004).
163. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006). The stated purpose of the
Lanham Act was, among other things, "to simplify registration and make it
stronger and more liberal, to dispense with mere technical prohibitions and
arbitrary provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief against infringement
prompt and simple." S. REP. No. 1333 (1946).
164. As noted earlier, supra note 49, the common law of unfair competition
protected "trade names," which included both secondary meaning marks and
business names. In liberalizing registration and protection for the full range of
indications of origin, the Lanham Act denominated both technical trademarks
and secondary meaning marks as "trademarks," and redefined the term "trade
name" to refer only to the name of a business. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). The
Lanham Act provided registration for all trademarks, as defined, but not for
trade names (as newly, more narrowly, defined), although Lanham Act § 43(a)
has subsequently been construed to protect trade names in the same manner as
unregistered trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
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trademarks and secondary meaning marks, including the fraudulent
intent requirement for trade name infringement.'65 All of the bills
introduced between 1938 and the enactment of the Lanham Act
effectively did these things. They provided for registration both of
inherently distinctive marks and of marks that were merely
descriptive, geographically descriptive, or surnames, but had
acquired secondary meaning.16   They provided registration for
service marks. 67  They provided for direct infringement of all
registered marks, regardless of the defendant's intent, 68  and
removed the fraudulent intent prerequisite from the cause of action
for "false designations of origin,' 69 which had originated in the 1920
Act and ultimately became the Lanham Act's infringement provision
for unregistered marks and other indications of origin. 7 °
Advocates for change also argued for an additional
liberalization of the definition of infringement. There had been
significant criticism of the prior acts' requirement that the
defendant use its allegedly infringing word or symbol in connection
with "merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as
those set forth" in the plaintiffs registration certificate.7' All the
165. See, e.g., CALLMANN, supra note 39, § 86.1(a), at 1723-24; 4 RUDOLF
CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 98.6, 98.7 (2d
ed. 1950); Grismore, supra note 53 passim; Handler & Pickett I & II, supra
notes 47 & 59 passim.
166. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1938); H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2 (1939); H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. § 2 (1939); S. 895, 77th Cong. § 2 (1941);
H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. (1941); H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2 (1944); H.R.
1654, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1945).
167. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. 2d Sess. § 4 (1938); H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3 (1939); H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. § 3 (1939); S. 895, 77th Cong. § 3 (1941);
H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. § 3 (1941); H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 3 (1944); H.R.
1654, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1945).
168. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1, 34 (1938); H.R. 4744, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 32 (1939); H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. § 32 (1939); S. 895, 77th Cong. § 32
(1941); H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. § 32 (1941); H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 32
(1944); H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 32 (1945).
169. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41 (1938); H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 44(a) (1939); H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. § 43(a) (1939); S. 895, 77th Cong. §
43(a) (1941); H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. § 43(a) (1941); H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 2nd
Sess. § 43(a) (1944); H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 43(a) (1945)
170. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
171. Edward S. Rogers, Some Suggestions Concerning a Trade-Mark
Registration Act, 43 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 412, 416 (1920); see, e.g., Edward C.
Luken, The Application of the Principles of Unfair Competition to Cases of
Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 202-05 (1927); Edward S. Rogers,
The Expensive Futility of the United States' Trade-Mark Statute, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 660, 668-71 (1914). Complaints focused on the vagueness and uncertainty
of the statutory language and the resulting inconsistency in the case law
regarding how similar the defendant's products had to be to the plaintiffs
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bills leading up to the Lanham Act did this as well.' 2 However,
significant research reveals nothing in the literature or the hearings
to suggest that the interested parties viewed the 1905 and 1920 Acts'
liberalized defendant "affixation or other close association"
infringement requirement to be problematic or sought to delete it.
As enacted, the Lanham Act acknowledged and solidified the
common law movement toward unifying the law of technical
trademark and secondary meaning mark 1irigement 3-providig
for registration and protection of "trademarks" and defining the
term "trademark" to include all distinctive indications of origin for
products, whether technical trademarks or secondary meaning
marks.'
7 4
Congress specified that marks that were not inherently
distinctive could be registered on a showing of secondary meaning...
and that demonstration of an applicant's exclusive, continuous use
for five years could be deemed prima facie evidence of secondary
meaning for purposes of registration. 76 The Lanham Act redefined
the term "trade name" (which had generally been used to refer both
to secondary meaning marks and business names under the law of
unfair competition), limiting the term to the name of a business.'
before infringement could be found. Critics also argued that limiting
infringement to cases where the parties marketed similar goods was too
narrow. See Bartholomew, supra note 96 (manuscript at 16-17).
172. See supra note 168.
173. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. f (1995)
("During the first half of the 20th century the substantive rules governing the
protection of "trademarks" and "trade names" became essentially identical, and
the significance of the distinction diminished. Passage of the Lanham Act in
1946 hastened the abandonment of the former terminology."); 3 CALLMANN,
supra note 39, § 81.3, at 1399 (discussing movement in the common law to
amalgamate trademark and secondary meaning mark (unfair competition) law);
Chafee, supra note 50, at 1296-98; Handler & Pickett I & II, supra notes 47 &
59 passim.
174. The Lanham Act defines a trademark as: "any word, name, symbol, or
device . . .used by a person . . .to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. §
1127. Congress recognized four different kinds of marks-trademarks, service
marks, collective marks, and certification marks-and determined that they
could all be registered on the Lanham Act Principal Register. §§ 1052-1054,
1127. This Article will use the term "mark" or trademark to refer to
trademarks, service marks, and collective marks, since the relevant Lanham
Act provisions are mainly the same for all.
175. Id. § 1052(e)-(f).
176. Id. § 1052(f).
177. Id. § 1127. While the names of business, as such, cannot be registered,
courts have construed Lanham Act section 43(a) to protect trade names on the
same basis as unregistered marks and trade dress. Id. § 1125(a).
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Congress provided a federal cause of action for infringement of
registered marks78 and, in addition, improved upon the Trademark
Act of 1920's cause of action for the use of "false designation[s] of
origin.' 1 9 The false designations of origin provision would be
construed, over time, to provide a broad federal cause of action for
infringement of unregistered indications of origin, including
unregistered marks, trade dress, and business names.8 0  Neither
infringement cause of action depended on a defendant's bad faith
intent to deceive consumers.
Though the Lanham Act primarily codified contemporary
common law doctrine,'8' as it had in the past, Congress did
determine that it had constitutional authority to enact new,
substantive trademark rights to augment the common law,
notwithstanding longstanding suggestions to the contrary.18 2 While
178. Id. § 1114(1)(a).
179. Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533. The substance of
section 3 was incorporated into Lanham Act section 43(a), with the coverage
extended to "services," as well as merchandise, and deletion of the requirement
that defendants act "willfully and with intent to deceive." See Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 777 (1992); Stolte, supra note 162, at 1346.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
181. See note 141, supra, and accompanying text.
182. As noted earlier, note 93 supra, and accompanying text, a number of
courts and commentators had suggested that Congress lacked such authority.
See, e.g., Am. Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926)
(suggesting that Congress "has been given no power to legislate upon the
substantive law of trade-marks"); Sylvester J. Liddy, Has Congress the
Constitutional Power to Legislate on the Substantive Law of Trade-Marks?, 6
FORDHAM L. REv. 408 (1937) (noting authority suggesting that congress lacked
the requisite power to legislate, but disagreeing with it). However, that
assertion had been criticized. See, e.g., Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133
F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1943) ("Although the question has never been squarely
decided by the Supreme Court, we believe it is clear that Congress has the
power to legislate upon the substantive law of trade-marks."); CALLMANN,
supra, note 66, § 97.2, at 1668-70 (reviewing the authorities and concluding
that Congress did, in fact have the necessary power under the Commerce
Clause). Congress, however, ultimately determined that it did possess the
necessary power. S. REP. No. 1333 (1946) ("There can be no doubt under the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of a national act
giving substantive, as distinguished from purely procedural rights in trade-
marks in commerce over which Congress has plenary power."); see Derenberg,
supra note 39, at 288 ("While the Act of 1905 was based on the theory that the
Federal Government could not under the commerce clause of the Constitution
enact legislation granting substantive statutory rights to the owner of a trade-
mark, the [Lanham Act] is based on the presupposition that within the realm of
commerce, as broadly defined in Section 45 of the Act, a federal registration
statute may create substantive rights beyond the mere procedural advantages
which resulted from registration under the previous acts.").
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exercising this authority sparingly, Congress provided a few specific
enhancements to common law trademark rights in order to provide
incentives to register and to make nationwide marketing more
efficient.1
3
We turn now to the specific Lanham Act provisions that are
relevant to the issue of trademark use as a prerequisite to
infringement liability.
C. The Relevant Statutory Provisions
The Lanham Act provides that in order to register a mark,
applicants must demonstrate that their marks have been "used in
commerce." 18 4 "Use in commerce" is defined in Lanham Act section
45,185 and entails two things: (1) a use of the mark that affects
interstate commerce (and thus provides federal authority to regulate
under the Constitution's Commerce Clause18 6); and (2) a prescribed
form of trademark use. While the common law of unfair competition
did not subject secondary meaning marks to an "affixation"
requirement, all Lanham Act registration applicants must satisfy
the full "use in commerce" requirement, even if they must also
demonstrate secondary meaning. Lanham Act section 45 provides
in full:
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark
in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to
reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a
mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce-
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers
or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels
affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with
the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered in
commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State
or in the United States and a foreign country and the person
183. These substantive enhancements include incontestability status for
marks registered for over five years, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b), and
constructive notice provisions to enhance the geographic scope of registered
marks. Id. § 1072; Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358
(2d Cir. 1959).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2008]
HeinOnline -- 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 941 2008
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection
with the services.18
7
The Lanham Act standard for infringement of registered marks,
set forth in section 32(1)(a), provides remedies against a person who,
without the consent of the registrant
uses in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.1 88
The Lanham Act section 43(a) provision for infringement of
unregistered marks imposes liability on
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person.
8 9
While the statutory language of sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)
differs, the provisions are generally understood to impose the same
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id. § 1114(1)(a) (emphasis added).
189. Id. § 1125(a) (emphasis added). The language reprinted above results
from an amendment made in the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Pub. L.
No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935. Prior to that amendment, the statutory language
was as follows:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or
represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter
into commerce ... shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing
business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or the region
in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that
he is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1987). While the case law had construed this
earlier language to provide a federal cause of action for unregistered mark
infringement, the construction was an awkward one. The amendments were
intended, among other things, to more nearly conform the statutory language to
the case law interpretation. See infra, notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
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standard for infringement.1 90
There are three ways that the Lanham Act may be deemed to
incorporate and impose a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate
the defendant's "trademark use" as a part of their prima facie
showing of infringement. First, the trademark use requirement may
arise from the "use in commerce" requirement set forth in both
sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a) and defined in section 45.1 Second, the
trademark use requirement may be found in the statutory
requirement (again imposed in both sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)) that
the allegedly infringing mark be used "on or in connection with"
192goods or services. Finally, the Lanham Act may implicitly
incorporate the trademark use requirement by virtue of having
codified the common law trademark infringement and unfair
competition causes of action. 193 Each of these three interpretations
will be discussed below.
D. Finding Trademark Use in the "Use in Commerce"
Requirement.
As the quoted passages from Lanham Act sections 32(1)(a) and
43(a) indicate, both infringement provisions require that the
defendant "use [the allegedly infringing word or symbol] in
commerce." Lanham Act section 45 (also quoted above) defines when
"use in commerce" occurs. This definition clearly requires two
things. First, it requires trademark use-close association of the
mark with the sale or distribution of goods or services. Trademarks
must be placed on goods or their containers, on displays associated
with the goods, on tags or labels affixed to the goods, or (when such
placement is impracticable) on documents associated with the goods
or their sale. (This language is highly reminiscent of the "affixation
or other close association" language of the 1905 and 1920 federal
trademark infringement provisions.) Service marks must be "used
or displayed in the sale or advertising of services.' 94 Second, the
goods or services must be sold, distributed, or rendered in interstate
195commerce.
Since both sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a) require that the
defendant "use [its allegedly infringing mark] in commerce," and the
190. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 636 (2003).
191. See infra Subsection II. D.
192. See infra Subsection II. E.
193. See infra Subsection II. F.
194. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
195. This ensures the necessary federal jurisdiction to regulate the use
under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2008]
HeinOnline -- 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 943 2008
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Lanham Act essentially defines "use in commerce" to mean
"trademark use that affects commerce," one might readily conclude
that the Lanham Act limits infringement liability to a defendant's
use of an allegedly infringing mark "as a trademark" for its goods or
services in commerce. 196 A number of courts have cited the section
45 definition of "use in commerce" as authority for requiring
infringement plaintiffs to demonstrate a form of trademark use on
the defendant's part.
197
However, as I have explained in a previous article, 98 the fit is
not perfect, due to some inconsistency in the statutory language.
The section 45 definition provides that trademarks are "used in
commerce" in connection with goods when they are placed on the
goods or their containers or on displays associated with the goods.
But it does not provide that a mark is "used in commerce" when it is
employed in advertising of goods. (Section 45 provides that service
marks are "used in commerce" when displayed in advertising, but
trademarks are not.) This limitation seems inconsistent with the
language of Lanham Act section 32, which specifically provides for
196. See Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for
Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds.,
2008). Goldman recognizes difficulties posed by the section 45 definitional
language, but nonetheless argues that:
A use in commerce should occur only when the defendant uses the
plaintiffs trademark to designate the source of the defendant's goods
or services. This source-designation requirement is explicit in the
definition of a "trademark," defined in §45 as a word (or other symbol)
used "to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods." This definition constitutes a predicate
requirement for protectable rights, but it also is a constituent
requirement of an infringement. Section 45's definition of "use in
commerce" references the definition of "trademark," thus implicitly
requiring that the defendant cannot infringe unless the defendant
makes a source-designating use of the third party trademark.
Id. at 418-19.
197. E.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d
Cir. 2005); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2003);
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 757 (E.D. Mich.
2003); Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, Inc. v. Bailey & Assocs., Inc., 197 F.
Supp. 2d 1197, 1212-13 (E.D. Mo. 2002); Macia v. Microsoft Corp., 152 F. Supp.
2d 535, 539 (D. Vt. 2001); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96
F. Supp. 2d 824, 830-33 (N.D. Ill. 2000); WHS Entm't Ventures v. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, 997 F. Supp. 946, 949-51 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Acad. of
Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 1279
(C.D. Cal. 1997); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. H4igh Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C.
1985); Nat'l Tuberculosis Ass'n v. Summit County Tuberculosis Health Ass'n,
122 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
198. Barrett, supra note 3, at 384.
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infringement liability when a trademark is "use[d] in commerce...
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or
advertising of any goods or services."1 99
Another commentator has pointed out that the section 45
definition of "use in commerce" for services is "fatally ambiguous"
200
and that the overall definition improperly focuses on the manner of
the defendant's use when it should focus on the impact-the
meaning that the use conveys to consumers.Y I do not find the
latter criticism convincing. There are good reasons to adopt a proxy,
such as the manner of the defendant's use, to ensure that
infringement liability is limited to situations in which the
defendant's use is substantially likely to communicate source. All
the prior federal trademark acts employed this proxy, as did the
common law. The manner of the defendant's use will generally
predict the impact on consumers and an objective evaluation of the
manner of the use is likely to be much more efficient than an inquiry
into the actual impact on consumers in every case. °2 Moreover,
there are ways in which the courts can further fine-tune the manner
of use inquiry to ensure that it closely predicts a source-indicating
199. It is more nearly consistent with the language of Lanham Act section
43(a), which does not expressly mention advertising. As explained more fully
infra at note 233 and accompanying text, the omission of advertising use in the
case of marks is likely to have been a drafting oversight.
200. McKenna, supra note 25 (manuscript at 34) ("According to § 1127, a
mark is used in commerce on services when it is 'used or displayed in the sale or
advertisement of services."').
201. Id. (manuscript at 29-37). McKenna also believes that imposing an
"affixation" requirement would make it impossible for plaintiffs to recover for
reverse infringement. Id. (manuscript at 33). However, as discussed supra at
notes 135, 135, 137 and 140, a reverse infringement claim should be framed as
"fraudulent marketing," or "passing off," rather than trademark infringement,
and actionable on that basis under Lanham Act section 43(a).
202. Focusing on the manner of the defendant's use also can reduce the
steady expansion of trademark rights that, according to McKenna, is the direct
result of predicating trademark rights strictly on easily manipulated consumer
perceptions. It can enable courts proactively to shape consumer expectations
and counteract mark owners' attempts to convince consumers that all third-
party uses of their marks must be licensed. It may enable courts to focus their
resources on redressing the kinds of mark uses that are most likely to
materially impair the effectiveness of marks to serve their purpose-cases at
the "core" of the trademark interest. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs
and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2118-23 (2004) (describing the
"core" interests that trademark law undertakes to protect, noting that the
benefits of affording protection in "core" cases are significantly greater than the
benefits of protection at the fringes (or in "expansion areas"), where costs may
exceed benefits).
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203
impact on consumers.
I do, however, agree that the section 45 definition is not an ideal
formulation of the trademark use requirement, even putting aside
the vagueness concerning use of service marks and the deletion of
use in advertising goods. While the definition's language is
calculated to define uses of marks that are generally likely to
communicate source to consumers, it is simultaneously too broad (as
Dinwoodie and Janis argue, mere application of a mark to a product
or its packaging does not automatically guarantee source
identification) and too narrow (not only omitting advertising use,
but also focusing on visual uses, to the seeming exclusion of sound or
other sensory communication). It also might be applied too
inflexibly.204 As I discuss in a later section, however, 20 5 courts in fact
have considerable flexibility to apply the section 45 standard in a
manner that more effectively serves its underlying purpose in the
infringement context.
Of course, "use in commerce" is a necessity at other points in the
Lanham Act: applicants to register marks demonstrate their own
use in commerce in order to establish ownership and registration
rights. Some commentators and circuit courts have argued that
Congress only intended the section 45 definition to apply in that
"acquisition of rights" context, and not in the infringement context.2 6
However, such a reading is inconsistent with normal rules of
statutory interpretation, which hold that the definition of a term in
the definitional section of an act controls interpretation of that term
203. They could, for example, establish rules of thumb for determining
whether the defendant's manner of use and placement of the mark is likely to
make a separate impression" on consumers. See infra note 328 and
accompanying text.
204. But see McKenna, supra note 25 (manuscript at 31 n.82) (suggesting
that the section 45 definition's statutory language could be read to enumerate
uses that must be deemed "uses in commerce," but not preclude courts from
finding that other actions constitute use in commerce as well).
205. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
206. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found for Apologetic Info. &
Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1052 (10th Cir. 2008); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom
Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1220 n.7 (11th Cir. 2008); Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 n.11 (9th Cir. 2004); 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 161, § 23:11.50, at 23-76 to 23-78; Dinwoodie & Janis,
Confusion, supra note 24, at 1612-13; McKenna, supra note 25 (manuscript at
30-31). Actually, the term "use in commerce" or "used in commerce" appears in
a number of contexts throughout the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1058 (duration of registration), 1065 (incontestability provisions),
1091 (supplemental register), 1115 (evidentiary value of registration), 1125(c)
(dilution provisions), 1126 (international conventions) (2006).
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wherever it appears throughout the act.2 °7 Indeed, section 45 itself
states that its definitions should apply in the construction of the
Lanham Act, "unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the
context." There is nothing in the Lanham Act's section 45
definitional section or elsewhere in the Act plainly indicating that
Congress intended to apply the "use in commerce" definition
selectively. °8
In any event, examination of the legislative history of the
Lanham Act and the federal trademark registration acts that
preceded it make it apparent that Congress did, in fact, intend the
section 45 definition of "use in commerce" to apply in the
infringement context. I reach this conclusion because: (1) this
construction is most consistent with the infringement provisions in
prior federal trademark acts, and there is no suggestion that
Congress intended to change their substance on this point; (2)
statements made in hearings on the bills suggest that participants
linked the section 45 definition with the infringement provisions;
and perhaps most importantly, (3) during the course of enactment,
the section 45 definition tracked changes in the section 32
infringement language from one bill to the next, clearly indicating
that the drafters primarily envisioned the section 45 definition to
work in conjunction with the infringement provisions, rather than
with the acquisition of rights provisions.
The first bill that Representative Lanham introduced in 1938
had been drafted by the American Bar Association's Patent
Section.209 This bill, House Bill 9041, provided for registration of
marks that had been "used in commerce."21 ° The registered mark
infringement provision prohibited "use in commerce" of copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks "upon or in
connection with" merchandise of such character that the use would
207. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994); Crooks v.
Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930); Fla. Dept. of Banking & Fin. v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 800 F.2d 1534, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986).
208. While one might argue that the "advertising use" discrepancy,
discussed above, indicates a contrary intent, that intent is not "plainly
apparent," as will be discussed infra at Subsection II. D.
209. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938). According to report, the Patent
Section had been working on the draft for a number of years. Earlier versions
of it had been introduced to Congress in the 1920s to no avail. In 1937, the
Commissioner of Patents asked Edward S. Rogers, a prominent member of the
Section, to meet with Congressman Lanham, who was the Chair of the House
Committee responsible for trademark legislation. Rogers gave Rep. Lanham
the ABA Patent Section draft, which Lanham introduced as House Bill 9041 in
January of 1938. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 161, § 5:4, at 5-10; Stolte, supra
note 162, at 1348-49.
210. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1938) (emphasis added).
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cause a likelihood of confusion.21' The definition section at the end of
the bill provided no definition of "use in commerce." It did provide
that "a trademark will be deemed applied to an article when it is
placed in any manner in or upon either the article or its container or
its display or to tags or labels or otherwise used in the
advertisement or sale thereof."
212
However, the term "applied" did not appear either in the
registration provision or in the registered mark infringement
provision. It only appeared in the "false designation of origin"
provision, which imposed liability on any person
who shall affix, apply or annex or use in connection with any
article or articles of merchandise, or any container or
containers of the same, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and
shall cause such merchandise to enter into commerce ....213
There was no definition of "affix," "annex," or "use in connection
with." The House Committee on Patents held hearings on this bill
but took no further action.
A new bill, House Bill 4744,214 was introduced in 1939. It
differed significantly from the American Bar Association's Patent
Section draft, returning to the general terminology and form of the
1905 Act. House Bill 4744 provided registration for marks that were
"used in commerce.""' With regard to infringement of registered
marks, the bill provided:
Any person who shall without the consent of the registrant
thereof reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any
trade-mark... and shall affix such reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation to merchandise of such character
that the use theeof is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to
211. Id. §§ 1, 34 (emphasis added). In the hearings, it was noted that this
language was broader than that in the 1905 Act "because it is not restricted to
copies used upon labels or prints, but any copy, counterfeit or trademark. For
example, it would apply to ads." Hearing on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. on
Trademarks of the H. Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong. 68 (1938) (statement of Mr.
Thompson). The bill also prohibited trafficking in counterfeit labels and
packaging materials.
212. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. § 43 (1938) (emphasis added).
213. Id. § 41 (emphasis added). This language remained constant
throughout the drafting process and was ultimately enacted in Lanham Act
section 43(a). As will be discussed infra note 251 and accompanying text, the
language was amended in 1988.
214. H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
215. Id. § 1.
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deceive purchasers, or to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements intended to be used
upon or in connection with the sale of such merchandise, and
shall use or have used such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
colorable imitation in commerce, shall be liable ....
This is almost exactly the language of the 1905 Act's
infringement provision, except that it adds advertisement use to the
list of prohibited trademark uses217 and describes the range of
merchandise on which the defendant must affix the mark more
broadly.21 The House Bill 4744 definition section provided that: "A
trademark shall be deemed to be affixed to an article when it is
placed in any manner in or upon either the article or its container or
display or upon tags or labels or is otherwise used in the
advertisement or sale thereof."21 9  This was the only relevant
definition.22 °  It clearly applied to the new registered mark
infringement provision and the false designation provision (which
remained the same as the quoted language from House Bill 9041,
supra notes 213, throughout the process), since the term "affix" did
not appear anywhere in the registration provision. The language of
this bill reinforces the impression that deleting the former
Trademark Acts' defendant "affixation or other close association"
requirement was not on Congress' reform agenda.
It should be noted that in tracking the 1905 language, the bill's
definition of infringement addressed use of marks in connection with
goods, but not services. However, unlike the 1905 Act, the Lanham
Act made service marks registerable, along with trademarks. The
bill's definition section provided that: 'Service marks' [sic] are
216. Id. § 32 (emphasis added).
217. As noted earlier, this addition reflects judicial construction of the 1905
infringement provision. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
218. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724. The 1905 Act
provided, at section 16:
[any person who shall, without the consent of the owner thereof,
reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such trade-mark
and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same
descriptive properties as those set forth in the registration, or to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended to be
used upon or in connection with the sale of merchandise of
substantially the same descriptive properties as those set forth
in such registration, and shall use, or shall have used, such
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation in commerce...
shall be liable ....
Id.
219. H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 46 (1939) (emphasis added).
220. The bills did provide a uniform definition of "commerce" throughout the
process: "all commerce which may be lawfully regulated by Congress." Id.
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marks so used as to distinguish the user's services of any nature
from the similar services of others."221
The House Committee on Patents held hearings on House Bill
4744, but then introduced a revised bill, House Bill 6618.222 The new
bill provided registration for marks "used in commerce," like the• 1 223
prior bills, but remembered that service marks could be infringed,
too, and revised the registered mark infringement provisions
accordingly:
Any person who shall, in commerce, without the consent of the
registrant . . . apply [a] reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation [of a registered mark] to merchandise or
services of such a character that the use thereof is likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers, or to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, or
advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection
with the sale of such merchandise or services . . . shall be
liable 224
In the definition section, House Bill 6618 substituted a
definition of "apply" for the earlier bill's definition of "affix,"
reflecting the change in the section 32 infringement provision. The
definition of "apply" was virtually identical to the former definition
of "affix."225 Thus, the new infringement provision incorporated a
reference to services, the definition of "affix/apply" did not. House
Bill 6618 nonetheless passed the House and the Senate. However, a
motion to reconsider was entered and agreed to the next day in the
Senate. The bill returned to the calendar and was not considered
again in the 76th Congress.226
Two different bills got play in the 77th Congress: Senate Bill
895227 and House Bill 5461.228 Both bills, like all their predecessors,
221. Id.
222. H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. (1939).
223. Id. § 1.
224. Id. § 32 (emphasis added). Section 32 also targeted persons (printers)
who reproduced marks at the behest of others, id. § 32(a), and added a very
broad, general prohibition of false marketing. Id. § 32(b).
225. Id. §45 ("[A] mark shall be deemed to be applied to an article when it is
placed in any manner in or upon either the article or its container or display or
upon tags or labels or is otherwise used in the advertisement or sale thereof in
commerce.").
226. H.R. REP. No. 79-219 (1945).
227. S. 895, 77th Cong. (1941). Senate Bill 895 passed in the Senate and the
House, then went back to the Senate for action on the House amendments. No
further action was taken in the Senate. H.R REP. No. 79-219 (1945). House Bill
102, a third bill introduced in the 77th Congress, was identical to Senate Bill
895.
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provided for registration of marks "used in commerce."229 However,
while Senate Bill 895 retained the registered mark infringement
language from House Bill 6618, quoted above, and the
accompanying definition of when a mark is "applied,"23 ° the House
Bill 5461 registered mark infringement provision broke new ground,
coming closer to the version that ultimately was enacted:
Any person who shall in commerce, . . . use, without the
consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
or colorable imitation of any registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or
services of such a character that such use is likely to cause
confusion or mistake, or to deceive purchasers . . . shall be
liable .... 231
The "use in commerce" language better accommodates the
section 32 function of defining service mark infringement-one
might more readily "use" a mark "with" a service than apply or affix
it "to" a service. In line with this change of language, the House Bill
5461 definition section exchanged a definition of "use in commerce"
for the previous definition of when a mark is "applied" to goods:
a mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce (a) on goods
when it is placed in any manner on the goods or their
containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags
or labels affixed thereto and the goods are sold or transported
in commerce and (b) on services when used or displayed in the
22sale or advertising of services in commerce.
This language, for the first time, specifies how service marks
must be used. The provision of how trademarks must be used,
228. H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. (1941).
229. S. 895, 77th Cong. § 1 (1941); H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. § 1 (1941).
230. S. 895, 77th Cong. §§ 32 & 45 (1941). Section 32 included language that
may have released the infringement cause of action from the trademark use
restriction. It stated that it would constitute infringement to "otherwise use
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation falsely to indicate
that the goods or services are the goods or services of a person who shall have
registered a mark under this Act." This very broad provision, however, like an
earlier "false marketing" provision in House Bill 6618, was destined to be
deleted.
231. H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. § 32 (1941) (emphasis added). This provision
also provided a form of contributory infringement liability for printers and
others who created or trafficked in infringing labels and packaging, and
prohibited use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, and colorable imitations
"falsely to indicate the source" of goods or services. Id. § 32(b), (c).
232. Id. § 45.
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however, carries on the essence of the definitions of "affix" and
"apply," in earlier bills, except that it deletes reference to use in
advertising.233 The "use in commerce" definition duplicates much of
the language of the earlier definitions of "affix" and "apply," and
234seems to perform the same function. However, there can be no
question that those earlier definitions were intended to apply to the
infringement provisions, rather than to the registration provisions,
since neither "affix" nor "apply" appeared in the registration
provisions.
It should also be noted that while the registration provision of
every prior bill had employed the term "use in commerce" to describe
marks that were eligible for registration, the definition section did
not provide a definition of "use in commerce" until the "in commerce,
use" language was substituted for "affix" and "apply" in the
registered mark infringement provision. Moreover, discussion in the
hearings on House Bill 5461 clearly indicate that the persons
participating in the hearings associated the new "use in commerce"
definition with the section 32 infringement provision .235
233. There is no explanation in the Hearings for the deletion of advertising
use. There was some concern expressed about interference with the publication
of magazines and newspapers. Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895
Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Committee on Patents, 77th
Cong., 177 (1941). However, this would not explain why advertising would
constitute an infringing use of service marks, but not trademarks. The most
likely explanation is that deleting advertising use in the case of trademarks was
a drafting oversight.
234. For comparison purposes, the earlier definition of "affix" appears in the
text accompanying note 219. The earlier definition of "apply" appears supra
note 225.
235. Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on
Trademarks of the House Committee on Patents, 77th Cong. 177 (1941). The
parties to the exchange set forth below refer to the infringement provision as "§
33," but the language of this section is the same as that set forth above as § 32.
Mr. Bailey: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Beesley has brought up a question
that involves the paragraph beginning with line 4, page 45 of the
committee print. Now, section 33(1)(a), that first section of 33, is
obviously intended, I think, only to apply to the actual infringer. That
is the person who sells the goods, and section (b) is intended to apply
to the printer, the newspaper, the label manufacturer, and the like.
In that definition of what use means, section 33(1)(a) starts off-
"Any person who shall, in commerce, use" and so forth. On page 45,
use of the mark on goods requires that the goods be sold or
transported in commerce, as set forth in line 8. On services, however,
it would seem to me, as Mr. Beesley has pointed out, somewhat
indefinite as to whether a newspaper carrying an advertisement of a
service might not be using the mark in the sense of lines 9 and 10, so I
propose this amendment in line 9, page 5, of the committee print:
After "when," insert "it is."
Mr. Lanham: So it will read "when it is used or displayed."
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House Bill 82,236 introduced in the 78th Congress, and House
Bill 1654,237 introduced in the 79th Congress, retained the same "use
in commerce" prerequisite for registration, 238 registered mark
infringement language,239 and definition24 ° as House Bill 5461,
described above, and this language was enacted in the Lanham
Act.2 1 Lanham Act section 43 enacted the language of the false
designation of origin cause of action, which appeared in the first bill,S 242
introduced in 1938, and never changed.
There have been subsequent amendments to the statutory
language, and three of them are relevant to the current discussion.
First, in 1962, Congress revised Lanham Act section 32(1)(a),
among other things, to change the first sentence from "[a]ny
person who shall, in commerce, (a) use, without the consent of
the registrant, any reproduction . . ." to "[a]ny person who shall,
without the consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any
reproduction .. ,,243 The accompanying House Report suggested
244that this change was to "clarify" and "refine" the Act's language.
This indicates (if there was any doubt) that "in commerce, use" is
equivalent to "use in commerce," as set forth elsewhere in the Act
and defined in section 45.
Second, when Congress enacted amendments to permit "intent-
to-use" applications to register marks, it amended Lanham Act
Mr. Bailey: And in line 10, after "services," insert "and the services are
rendered." That would make it consistent with the first part of that
same paragraph.
Mr. Thomas Quinn Beesley: That is acceptable to me, Mr. Chairman. I
represent the National Council on Business Mail, which is made up of
the largest users of mail in the country. We feel that that clarification
is correct.
Mr. Lanham: Is not that really the intent of that, Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin: Precisely. There is no objection to it that I can see.
These suggested changes to the definition of "use in commerce" were
incorporated into the definition in H.R. 82, which was the next bill to be
considered. H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 45 (1943).
236. H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
237. H.R.1654, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
238. H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.§ 1 (1943); H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1 (1945).
239. H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 32 (1943); H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 32 (1945).
240. H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 45 (1943); H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 45 (1945).
241. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114(1)(a), 1127 (2006).
242. Id. § 1125(a). For reference, that language is reproduced supra text
accompanying note 213.
243. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772 § 17, 76 Stat. 773 (emphasis
added).
244. H.R. REP. No. 87-1108, at 2 (1961).
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section 45 to provide that "token uses" of marks, which the Patent
and Trademark Office had previously accepted to satisfy the "use in
commerce" prerequisite to registration,45 would no longer be a
sufficient basis for registration: "The term 'use in commerce' means
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not
made merely to reserve a right in a mark."2 46  A Senate Report
generated in the course of this amendment stated that "the revised
definition is intended to apply to all aspects of the trademark
registration process .... Clearly, however, use of any type will
continue to be considered in an infringement action."247 Professors
Dinwoodie and Janis cite this statement as evidence that Congress
only intended the section 45 definition of "use in commerce" to apply
to the Lanham Act's registration provisions.248 However, while the
statement clearly indicates that Congress intended (at least, in
1988) for the section 45 definition to apply when "use in commerce"
appears in the registration provisions (this is already confirmed by
245. See Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1266-67 (5th Cir.
1975).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The amendment was enacted in the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 134(8), 102 Stat. 3946.
247. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 44-45 (1988). More fully, the report says:
Amendment of the definition of "use in commerce" is one of the most
far-reaching changes the legislation contains. Revised to eliminate
the commercially transparent practice of token use, which becomes
unnecessary with the legislation's provision for an intent-to-use
application system, it will have a measurable effect on improving the
accuracy of the register (by permitting the removal of "deadwood") and
determining whether a party has abandoned its rights in a mark.
The committee intends that the revised definition of "use in
commerce" be interpreted to mean commercial use which is typical in
a particular industry. Additionally, the definition should be
interpreted with flexibility so as to encompass various genuine, but
less traditional, trademark uses, such as those made in test markets,
infrequent sales of large or expensive items, or ongoing shipments of a
new drug to clinical investigators by a company awaiting FDA
approval, and to preserve ownership rights in a mark if, absent an
intent to abandon, use of a mark is interrupted due to special
circumstances. Finally, the revised definition is intended to apply to
all aspects of the trademark registration process, from applications to
register, whether they are based on use or on intent-to-use, and
statements of use filed under Section 13 of the Act, to affidavits of use
filed under Section 8, renewals and issues of abandonment. Clearly,
however, use of any type will continue to be considered in an
infringement action.
The revised definition also recognizes that strict affixation of a
trademark is often impractical in the case of bulk goods. It provides
that use in commerce on or in connection with certain products, such
as oil, chemicals and grain, can be established when the products are
shipped in railroad cars, ships, aircraft, or other vehicles and the
mark is used "on documents associated with the goods or their sale."
248. Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1611-12.
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the preliminary language in section 45),249 it does not demonstrate
that Congress intended that the definition not be applied when "use
in commerce" appears in the infringement provisions. The
statement merely clarifies that the new language, requiring "bona
fide use in the ordinary course of trade" is not applicable in the
infringement context. Thus, the plaintiff does not have to
demonstrate that the defendant made an ongoing, regular use that
is typical of mark use in the relevant industry. A defendant's
isolated or irregular use of the mark (which otherwise complies with
the "use in commerce" definition) may infringe.
Third, as part of the same comprehensive revisions that
introduced the intent-to-use application process and amended
section 45 as described above, Congress updated the language of
Lanham Act section 43(a). As originally enacted, the pertinent
portion of section 43(a) provided:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in
connection with any goods or services, or any container or
containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and
shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce
shall be liable ....
The 1988 revisions reworded this language to provide:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation
of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person . . . shall
be liable .... 251
The Senate Report explained that the revision was meant to
codify the courts' interpretation of section 43(a). As written, section
249. This language specifies that the definitions provided by the section
should be used "[in the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is
plainly apparent from the context." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
250. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946) (emphasis added).
251. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102
Stat. 3946 (emphasis added).
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43(a) appeared "to deal only with false descriptions or
representations and false designations of geographic origin."
252
Since its enactment in 1946, however, section 43(a) had "been widely
interpreted as creating, in essence, a federal law of unfair
competition."
25 3
In addition to more clearly recognizing that the section 43(a)
cause of action extended to infringement of unregistered marks, this
revision substituted the "use in commerce" language for the previous
"affix, apply, or annex" language. Nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended the change to be a substantive one.
One of the stated purposes of the 1988 revisions was to facilitate
uniform interpretation of the various Lanham Act provisions.254
Thus, it is likely that Congress exchanged the "affix" and "apply"
language for "use in commerce" to clarify that section 43(a)
unregistered mark infringement claims require the same kind of
infringing use as section 32(1)(a) registered mark claims. Congress
treated the terms "affix," "apply," and "use in commerce" as
conceptually interchangeable in drafting the Lanham Act's
registered mark infringement and definition sections. It is likely
that it likewise considered them conceptually interchangeable in
amending the section 43(a) unregistered mark infringement
provisions in 1988. But if these terms are conceptually
interchangeable, then "use in commerce," as provided in the
infringement provisions, cannot be solely an assurance of federal
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, as critics of "trademark
use" have contended. "Use in commerce" must also define the
manner in which the defendant associates the contested mark with
its goods or services. And if it does, then surely the definition of
"use in commerce" in Lanhan Act section 45 is consistent and
applicable.
In summary, the Lanham Act's legislative history makes it clear
that Congress did not intend for the section 45 definition of "use in
commerce" only to apply in the registration context, but, in fact (at
least at the time of enactment) associated the definition more
directly with the infringement context than the registration context.
The "use in commerce" definition conceptually incorporates and
perpetuates the essential "affixation or other close association" (or
252. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988) (emphasis added).
253. Id. The Report added: "For example, [section 43(a)] has been applied to
cases involving the infringement of unregistered marks, violations of trade
dress and certain nonfunctional configurations of goods and actionable false
advertising claims." Id.
254. 134 CONG. REC. 150, S16,972 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (noting that
one of the objectives of the revisions was "clarification and modification of many
Lanham Act provisions to facilitate the act's uniform interpretation").
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"trademark use") requirement of the 1905 and 1920 trademark acts.
E. Finding Trademark Use in the "On or In Connection With"
Language
An alternative way to find that Congress incorporated
trademark use into the Lanham Act's infringement provisions is to
focus on the language, found in both sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a),
requiring that the defendant's use of the mark "on or in connection
with" goods or services be likely to cause confusion. Again,
Professors Dinwoodie and Janis argue that this language is too
broad to be understood as a trademark use limitation.255 However,
the "on or in connection with" language can be understood as a term
of art whose meaning arises from its historically close association
with the trademark use requirement, causing it to stand as a proxy
for trademark use. As Judge Leval has explained, the Lanham Act
undertakes to codify the common law doctrine, and in doing so,
adopts general, sometimes vague or circumspect words and phrases
commonly used in the field as a means of giving statutory
256recognition to a body of law previously developed by the courts.
Terms incorporated into statutes that adopt pre-existing common
law doctrine, such as the Lanham Act, should not be defined with
dictionaries.257
Many of the Lanham Act's key provisions are quite brief. They
consist of vague phrases such as "exclusive right to use," and "use
which is likely to cause confusion."258 But through those phrases,
the Lanham Act incorporates the complete common law
development--complex doctrine that would require dozens of pages
to set forth in full.
259
There is ample evidence to link the phrase "on or in connection
with" or "in connection with" to the trademark use requirement. In
1930 Handler and Pickett (who opposed a strict, technical
"affixation" requirement, but nonetheless advocated a form of
trademark use limitation on infringement liability)260 suggested a
255. Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1615.
256. Leval, supra note 55, at 196-98.
257. Id. at 198 ("The proposition that courts should approach the task of
interpretation armed only with a dictionary is wholly inappropriate to
delegating statutes [like the Lanham Act]. The words of the statute simply will
not provide the answers and were not intended by the legislature to do so. In
passing delegating statutes, legislatures recognize that they function together
with courts in a law-making partnership, each having its proper role.").
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Handler and Pickett defined trademark use as a use that denominates
or designates a species of commodity or a particular business, and is commercial
2008]
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"use in connection with" standard, in lieu of "affixation."261' The first
bill in the Lanham Act revision process, drafted by the Patents
Section of the American Bar Association, defined registered mark
infringement as "use in commerce of [a] copy, counterfeit, or
colorable imitation upon or in connection with merchandise."262 It
seems clear from the language itself and the context that the
drafters viewed this language as serving a function similar to that
served by the 1905 Act's "affixation or other close association"• 263
requirement. The original language of the Lanham Act section
43(a) unregistered mark infringement provision held liable any
person "who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with"any rtice of 1 "264
any article of merchandise. This clearly places "use in connection
with" in the same general category of action as "affixation,"
"application," and "annexation."265 We know from the legislative
history discussed in the prior section that Congress saw at least
three of these terms-"apply," "affix," and "use"-as conceptually
interchangeable and subject to essentially the same definition.266
The registered mark infringement sections in House Bills
4744,267 and 6618,268 and Senate Bill 895269 all required that the
defendant affix the mark directly to merchandise or to labels, signs,
prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles "used upon or in
connection with" sale of the merchandise.
This context again implies a direct and close association of the
printed mark to merchandise the defendant is offering for sale, and
thus a trademark use.
in nature. Handler & Pickett I, supra note 47, at 170-71.
261. Handler & Pickett II, supra note 59, at 764 n.22.
262. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. §1 (1938) (emphasis added).
263. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946) (emphasis added).
265. The "false designation of origin" provision in all of the bills leading up
to the Lanham Act, and the original Lanham Act section 43(a) itself provided:
"Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
article or articles of merchandise, or any container or containers of the same, a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation . . . and
shall cause such merchandise to enter into commerce ... shall be liable ....
H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41 (1938); H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. §
44(a) (1939); H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. §43(a) (1939); S. 895, 77th Cong. § 43(a)
(1941); H.R. 5461, 77th Cong, § 43(a) (1941); H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. §
43(a) (1943); H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 43(a) (1945).
The earliest false designation of origin provision in the 1920 Act had
the same language, with the addition of a fraudulent intent requirement.
Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533.
266. See supra Subsection II D.
267. H.R. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 32 (1939).
268. H.R. 6618, 76th Cong. § 32 (1939).
269. S. 895, 77th Cong. § 32 (1941).
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While there was no indication that the drafters intended to
make a significant substantive change from those earlier bills,
House Bill 5461270 dropped the former bills' specific recitation of
places (merchandise, labels, wrappers, etc.) that the defendant must
"affix" or "apply" the mark and simply provided that the defendant
must use the mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or
advertising of any goods or services. The subsequent bills27' and
Lanham Act section 32(1)(a)272 carried that simpler language
forward and then repeated the "in connection with" requirement,
just for good measure: they provided that the defendant must use
the mark "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion."273 This language stresses the
connection, or association of the mark with the defendant's goods or
services in the same manner that "affix" and "apply" did in earlier
drafts, and thus imposes essentially the same "trademark use"
requirement. It is less specific, more flexible, and certainly more
appropriate for describing the relationship between a mark and
services.2" But the context in which Congress used it strongly
suggests that Congress saw the "on or in connection with" language
as essentially interchangeable with the earlier, more specific "affix"
and "apply" trademark use language and as playing the same
limiting role.
Probably most of the courts that have cited statutory authority
for the trademark use requirement have cited to the "use in
commerce" provision. However, a significant number appear to have
focused on the "on or in connection with" language instead.275 The
Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected arguments that the sections
32(1)(a) and 43(a) "use in commerce" language impose a trademark
use requirement, finding that "use in commerce" is purely
jurisdictional in nature.276 However, in Bosley Medical Institute, Inc.
270. H.R. 5461, 77th Cong. § 32 (1941).
271. H.R. 1654, 79th Cong. § 32 (1945); H.R. 82, 78th Cong. § 32 (1943).
272. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Congress made the same progression from specific to more general
trademark use language when it revised the Lanham Act section 43(a)
unregistered mark infringement provision: It replaced "affix, apply, or annex, or
use in connection with" with "on or in connection with." See supra notes 250-54
and accompanying text. There was no suggestion that Congress believed that it
was making a substantive change in the long-established concept of
infringement.
275. See, e.g., Huthwaite, Inc. v. Sunrise Assisted Living, Inc., 261 F. Supp.
2d 502, 512 (E.D. Va. 2003); Williams v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 57 F. Supp.
2d 961, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
276. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024
2008]
HeinOnline -- 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 959 2008
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Tr 277v. Kremer, the Ninth Circuit appeared to rely on the "in connection
with" language to hold that defendants must use the contested mark
in a commercial transaction or a competitive context.278  More
recently, both the Tenth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have
emphasized the "in connection with" language as the proper source
of any "use" limitation on infringement liability, to the exclusion of
the "use in commerce" language.279
F. Finding an Implicit Trademark Use Requirement
A third way to find the trademark use requirement in the
Lanham Act infringement causes of action is to recognize that the
Lanham Act implicitly incorporates it from the common law, even in
the absence of express statutory language.
As noted earlier, the prior federal trademark acts purported
only to codify common law principles of trademark infringement and
unfair competition. Those Acts supplemented the common law
rights with procedural advantages associated with registration and
federal jurisdiction for infringement suits. While Congress
undertook to provide some substantive, as well as procedural,
enhancements for Lanham Act registrants, it is generally
understood and acknowledged that the Lanham Act, like the earlier
federal trademark acts, primarily was intended to codify and unify
n.11 (9th Cir. 2004). "Use in commerce," as used in infringement provisions, is
purely jurisdictional in nature. Id. While Lanham Act section 45 defines "use
in commerce," that definition "applies to the required use a plaintiff must make
in order to have rights in a mark, as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1051" and not to the
issue of infringement. Id.
277. 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
278. Id. at 676-80. More recently the Ninth Circuit appears to have
reconsidered its position that the "use in commerce" provision serves only a
jurisdictional purpose. In Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.
2007), the court appeared to rely on the "use in commerce" language for the
proposition that an infringement defendant must use the mark to promote a
competing product or to reap a profit. Id. at 903.
279. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research,
527 F.3d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir. 2008); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide,
Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1218-20 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2008). A number of courts that
have looked to the "in connection with" language have not construed it to
impose a meaningful "trademark use" limitation, however. As I have discussed
in an earlier article, see Barrett, supra note 3, courts applying this language
have sometimes found its requirement to be satisfied by connecting the "use" of
a defendant who does not sell or advertise goods or services to the plaintiffs
sale of goods or services, or to the sales of third parties. See, e.g., People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001);
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1997); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282
(D.N.J.), afd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
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the common law."'
Judge Leval has explained:
What may look on its face like a legislative creation of a
body of rules is in fact nothing more than a cursory legislative
recognition of a long pre-existing body of law developed by
courts through the common law process. And in choosing the
words of the statute, at least to the extent it deals
circumspectly with the exclusive rights inhering in a
trademark, Congress expressed no intent either to change the
nature of the trademark right which the courts had developed,
211or to change the process for its continuing development.
Accordingly, courts construe and apply the Lanham Act in light
of common law doctrine and continue to apply common law doctrine
even when it is not explicitly codified in the language of the Lanham
Act. 282 For example, courts recognized and applied the doctrine of
functionality, in limiting rights in product and packaging trade
dress, for years before Congress amended the Lanham Act expressly
to incorporate it. 213  Likewise, courts routinely equate common
words, shapes, and designs to descriptive, geographically
descriptive, and surname marks and subject them to a showing of
secondary meaning pursuant to Lanham Act sections 2(e) and (f),
even though there is no explicit statutory directive for them to do
so.28 4  Courts in federal infringement cases have also imposed a
trademark use limitation on infringement claims, when it was
relevant to do so, relying on common law doctrine, without any
citation to statutory authority.285
Professors Dinwoodie and Janis acknowledge that implicit
incorporation of a common law trademark use doctrine is
"plausible."86 However, they argue287 that there was no general
280. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
281. Leval, supra note 55, at 198-99.
282. Davis, supra note 141, at 246-47; McClure, supra note 108, at 341.
283. Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112
Stat. 3064 (1998); see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 161, § 7:63.
284. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (2006); Citizens Banking Corp.
v. Citizens Fin. Group, Inc., No. 07-11514, 2008 WL 1995104, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
2008); 1 McCARTHY, supra note 161, § 7:29.
285. See, e.g., Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc., v. Gentile Prods.,
134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86
F.3d 619, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1996); Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775,
784 n.9 (E.D. Mich. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir.
2003). See generally Leval, supra note 55, at 194-95 (recognizing a trademark
use limitation in Lanham Act cases arising from the common law).
286. Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1616 ("In its general
form, the argument of common law incorporation is plausible. Early federal
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trademark use doctrine in the common law that could have been
implicitly incorporated, and add that even if such a common law
doctrine existed, Congress superceded it by codifying the common
law fair use defense in Lanham Act section 33(b)(4).289 However, the
trademark use and fair use doctrines co-existed peacefully in the
common law, and as I explain in another article,8 9 can continue to
be reconciled. 9 °
Professors Dogan and Lemley appear to recognize the existence
of a trademark use requirement in the statutory language,29 ' but
also argue that a trademark use requirement is implicit in the
likelihood of confusion standard (whose factors take for granted that
the defendant has used the mark to promote its own sales) and in
cases defining indirect infringement liability.
292
Professor McKenna finds an implicit trademark use
trademark registration statutes were understood as schemes to acknowledge
and confirm the existence of common law rights, and the Lanham Act retained
that general approach. Moreover, U.S. trademark law has long recognized
extra-statutory defenses to statutory causes of action.").
287. Id. at 1618-23.
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006); see Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra
note 24, at 1617.
289. Barrett, supra note 46. The fair use defense evolved from the
requirement that unfair competition defendants use the allegedly infringing
word or symbol in its secondary (trademark) meaning rather than in its
primary (descriptive, geographically, or surname) meaning, as a prerequisite to
liability. See supra note 61. As I explain in the cited article, the trademark use
that an infringement plaintiff must demonstrate is objectively measured and
serves as a gate keeping mechanism generally to limit the scope of infringement
liability to comport with the limited purposes of trademark protection. The fair
use defense becomes relevant once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of
trademark use, effect on commerce and a likelihood of confusion. It provides
added leeway for defendants to use words and symbols in their primary
(nontrademark) meaning. While the fair use defense requires that the
defendant use the word or symbol "otherwise than as a mark," evaluation of
this issue focuses on the defendant's apparent purpose and good faith in
applying the contested word or symbol. Even though the defendant made a
"trademark use" in the objective sense, by closely associating the contested
word or symbol with goods or services it offered for sale or distribution, and
even if this use resulted in a likelihood of confusion, the defendant may be
excused from liability if the use was for the primary (nontrademark) meaning of
the word or symbol rather than the trademark meaning.
290. Indeed, Congress clearly codified both a trademark use and a fair use
limitation in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(2006). See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use
Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
541, 550-51,553 (2008).
291. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1676-77.
292. Id. at 1678-81.
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requirement through more roundabout reasoning. He notes that the
Lanham Act requires that an infringement defendant's actions
cause a likelihood of confusion about source, but he reasons that it is
impossible to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of confusion
unless the defendant used the mark in the manner of a trademark
293to indicate source. Thus, the result is that only defendants who
use the mark as a trademark can be liable for infringement. 294
Professor McCarthy seems at least partially to agree with this
295reasoning.
I agree that the likelihood of confusion analysis evidences an
underlying assumption of the defendant's trademark use.296
However, as the prior sections explain, I believe that there are more
direct and compelling routes to finding the trademark use
requirement in the Lanham Act. Moreover I disagree with Professor
McKenna's assertion that a finding of trademark use depends on a
concurrent finding of a likelihood of confusion. Trademark use and
likelihood of confusion are completely separate issues. Trademark
use, properly defined, is an objective inquiry that does not turn on a
case-by-case analysis of actual consumer understanding. The
trademark use requirement ensures that the defendant applied the
contested word or symbol in a manner that was substantially likely
to communicate source to consumers, by ensuring a close, direct
association of mark to goods that the user is offering for sale or
distribution. The likelihood of confusion and related fair use
inquiries undertake to determine which (if any) source the word or
symbol is likely to communicate. The trademark use requirement,
properly construed, serves a gate keeping function to prevent
prolonged infringement litigation (or credible threats of prolonged
infringement litigation) in cases in which serious and material
consumer confusion is unlikely (because of the manner of the
293. Dinwoodie and Janis predictably disagree with this assertion, arguing
that there can be consumer confusion about source, sponsorship, or affiliation
even in cases in which the defendant does not use the mark to indicate these
things. Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1625-28. I take no
position on whether consumers could be genuinely confused by non-trademark
uses of marks, but note that to the extent such confusion might occur, any
societal interest in preventing it would likely be outweighed by competition and
First Amendment concerns.
294. McKenna, supra note 25 (manuscript at 7-8, 35-36, 39-40).
295. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 161, § 3:3 ("The requirement that to be
infringing, an accused use must be used as a trademark is not explicit in the
Lanham Act. However, unless the accused use is a trademark use, likelihood of
confusion is highly unlikely.").
296. However, I disagree with Professor McKenna's assertion that
trademark use can only be evaluated by ascertaining actual consumer
understanding.
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defendant's use). In such cases, any possible societal harm is
unlikely to outweigh the costs of the potentially lengthy litigation to
competition and to First Amendment interests.
III. DEFINING THE TRADEMARK USE DOCTRINE TODAY
As the prior sections demonstrate, the trademark use doctrine
played a central role in defining trademark rights in the common
law and surely has been incorporated into the Lanham Act,
regardless of which of the three "routes" the reader prefers it to have
taken.297 We have ongoing evidence of Congress' intent to retain the
trademark use limitation, both in its repeated refusal to extend the
statutory language expressly to prohibit non-trademark uses,29' and
297. It is particularly difficult to imagine that Congress would have
intended to abandon the trademark use doctrine when adopting the Lanham
Act, given that it was simultaneously recognizing the demise of the fraudulent
intent requirement, which the common law had long implemented as a means
of balancing trade name owners' interest in good will against the public's
interest in competitor access to common and descriptive words and symbols.
The trademark use doctrine also performs that function, and undoubtedly does
it better, than did the (by then) antiquated, and rather watered down
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate the defendant's fraudulent intent.
298. For example, in drafting Senate 895, 77th Congress § 32 (1941),
Congress quickly rejected proposed language that would impose infringement
liability on:
[any person who shall, in commerce, without the consent of the
registrant . . .apply [a] reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation to merchandise or services of such a character that the use
thereof is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers, or to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with the
sale of such merchandise or services or ... shall otherwise use such
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation falsely to
indicate that the goods or services are the goods or services of a person
who shall have registered a mark under this Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
Likewise, in 1951 and 1953, Congress rejected proposed amendments to
Lanham Act § 32(1) that would extend liability to "[any person who shall,
without the consent of the registrant. . . employ a registered mark in commerce
otherwise than as a trade or service mark in such a manner as to be likely to
cause the mark to lose its significance as a mark." S. 1957, 82d Cong. § 19
(1951) (emphasis added); S. 2540, 83d Cong. § 22 (1953) (emphasis added). This
action suggests Congressional understanding that, absent such an amendment,
only use of a mark as a trademark would infringe. Indeed, in a letter submitted
in Hearings on Senate 2540, Daphne Leeds, Assistant Commissioner of
Trademarks, noted that there was currently no right to prevent the bill's
enumerated acts "unless the mark is actually used by infringers on or in
connection with goods or services or on labels intended to be so used." Hearing
on S. 2540 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 98
(1954) (emphasis added).
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in its recent express imposition of a trademark use requirement in
the trademark dilution context.9 Moreover, a number of recent
decisions from other common law based countries reaffirm the
common law roots of the trademark use doctrine as those countries,
like the United States, explore the perimeters of their own version of
the doctrine in the modern marketplace. 00
Courts should continue to apply the trademark use doctrine as a
means of arbitrating the potentially conflicting private economic
interests of trademark owners and the public interest. The relevant
public interests have been discussed elsewhere, but bear briefly
repeating here. First, as I have written elsewhere, the trademark
use doctrine serves important First Amendment interests.0 ' It
limits trademark owners' control of potentially expressive words and
symbols primarily to commercial speech-speech that does no more
than propose a commercial t 30 -where the implicated
trademark interests arguably can be found to outweigh First
Amendment concerns.0 3 Second, the trademark use requirement
299. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Dogan & Lemley, supra note
290, at 551-52. But see William G. Barber, Dumping the "Designation of
Source" Requirement from the TDRA: A Response to the Alleged "Trademark Use
Requirement in Dilution Cases," 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J
559, 561 (2008).
300. See, e.g., Shell Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Esso Standard Oil (Austl.) Ltd.
(1963) 109 C.L.R 407 (Austl.) (Australian law requires trademark use as a
prerequisite to infringement liability); Cie Generale des Etablissements
Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada, [1997] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348; [1997]
124 F.T.R. 192; [1997] 2 F.C. 306; [19961 CarswellNat 2297 (Canadian law
requires trademark use as a prerequisite to infringement, in addition to a
showing of likelihood of confusion); Verimark (PTY) Ltd. v. BMW AG 2007 SCA
53 (RSA) (South African law requires trademark use as a prerequisite to
infringement liability); R v. Johnstone, [2004] E.T.M.R. 18 (H.L.) (U.K)
(Infringement in United Kingdom requires that the mark be used as a "badge of
origin."). See generally Po Jen Yap, Making Sense of Trademark Use, 2007 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 420 (arguing that the European Court of Justice has
declared that, to be liable, an unauthorized mark user must use the registered
mark as an indicator of the trade origin of his goods).
301. Barrett, supra note 5, at 978-87; Barrett, supra, note 3, at 378-79.
302. For discussion and definitions of "commercial speech" see Barrett,
supra, note 5, at 987-89. See also Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment
Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008) (arguing for a higher
level of First Amendment scrutiny of trademark claims across the board).
Limiting trademark infringement actions to "commercial contexts," as Prof.
McCarthy and others would do, see, for example, 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 161,
§ 25:76, does not in itself ensure that the use is commercial speech. Much
speech that takes place in a commercial context is fully-protected speech under
the First Amendment, and permitting trademark owners to prohibit it raises
serious First Amendment concerns.
303. That is not to say that prohibiting use of marks in commercial speech
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helps to prevent assertion of trademark rights in anticompetitive
ways and in ways that reduce the free flow of useful product
information to consumers."' Third, particularly in the digital
context, the trademark use doctrine may prevent trademark
interests from chilling the development of new media and new
cannot in itself violate First Amendment interests. See generally David Kohler,
At the Intersection of Comic Books and Third World Working Conditions: Is it
Time to Re-Examine the Role of Commercial Interests in the Regulation of
Expression?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 145 (2000) (questioning the
justification for basing level of First Amendment protection on speaker's
commercial motivation); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (1990) (arguing that
commercial speech should enjoy the same level of protection as fully protected
speech); Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70
TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2003) (arguing that the First Amendment prohibits
protection of descriptive marks).
It is quite clear at this point that the likelihood of confusion
requirement, by itself, fails to square trademark protection with the First
Amendment. See Barrett, supra note 5, at 984-85 (citing case decisions
demonstrating that courts have stretched the concept of confusion to extreme
lengths-situations where consumers might think that the plaintiff licensed the
defendant to put its mark on the defendant's totally different type of product, or
that the plaintiff simply acquiesced in the placement, and to situations where
the defendant's use only created "initial interest confusion.") Indeed, some
modern courts have been willing to find actionable likelihood of confusion
virtually whenever the defendant's use threatens to undermine the mark's
distinctiveness or the plaintiffs business good will, despite the lack of any
meaningful likelihood that an appreciable number of consumers will be misled.
Id.; see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006) (demonstrating that
a finding of likelihood of confusion in practice turns primarily on only two
elements-the similarity of the parties' marks and the defendant's intent).
304. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 3, at 450 (discussing arguments that
overprotection of marks has anticompetitive effects); Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 23, at 1694-98 (discussing how, given the modem breadth of likelihood of
confusion findings, the trademark use limitation serves as a gatekeeper to
shield entities-ranging from grocery stores, to advertisers, publishers and
search engines-from the anticompetitive and chilling effects of costly,
uncertain infringement claims, and also noting that in the absence of such a
screening device, consumer search costs may rise); Goldman, supra note 196, at
414-24 (noting that application of the trademark use requirement to screen
infringement claims is efficient and necessary in order to protect "word of
mouth" discussion and reviews of products on the Internet, and to protect
highly useful product review websites).
Even Professors Dinwoodie and Janis admit that their "contextual"
approach to evaluating infringement claims based on likelihood of confusion
alone, coupled with vague instructions for courts to "balance competing
interests" "has the potential to chill some valuable social and commercial
activity." Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1663.
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business models that may ultimately benefit consumers. 35  The
trademark use requirement can also provide a rational framework,
or baseline, for evaluating the likely impact and materiality of
defendants' new online or other high technology applications of
others' marks. °6 Finally, development of a meaningful and certain
trademark use doctrine in the digital context may serve proactively
to shape consumer expectations and thus counteract the forces that
increasingly suggest a licensing or sponsoring relationship whenever
a mark appears in a context not of the mark owner's creating. 0
These are the purposes that courts should bear in mind in
shaping and applying the trademark use doctrine in new settings
and circumstances.
A. Concerns about Rigidity and Formalism
Some commentators have expressed concern that the trademark
use requirement is too rigid and formalistic, especially if it is
deemed to derive from the Lanham Act's definition of "use in
commerce."0° This is not as great a concern as it might at first
seem, however. When legislation deliberately codifies common law
doctrine, as the Lanham Act did, it is generally understood that
courts have considerable leeway in construing and adapting it.
Judge Leval has explained that such enactments are not intended
to, and do not, alter the future development of the codified doctrine.
Thus,
[t]he court's dynamic function, by which it previously created
and shaped the law, is not superseded; it continues to operate,
notwithstanding that the law is now expressed in statutory
form. As new questions arise, the courts' answers to these
questions should be derived from the same considerations that
governed the development of the doctrine, rather than from
305. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 23, at 831-32 (expressing
concern that expansive application of trademark laws may interfere with
development of efficient search algorithms and with mechanisms that can
decrease consumer search costs through provision of customized advertisements
or information); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark
Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 509 (2005) ("Without limits, trademark law has the
capacity to counterproductively destroy the Internet's utility for everyone.").
306. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 423-50 (discussing how trademark use
analysis (and analogies to trademark use in comparable, concrete world
settings) can assist in understanding the impact and meaning of new, high
technology uses of marks); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1685 (discussing
evaluation of infringement claims based on juxtaposition).
307. For discussion of this problem, see, for example, McKenna, supra note
25 (manuscript at 6-7).
308. Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1658.
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the words chosen by the legislature to summarize or represent
that doctrine. Those words were not intended as exercises of
the legislature's power to create law . . . . The legislature
delegates to the courts the continued exercise of the function
they always performed, the continued development of the
common law doctrine in the light of the policies that always
drove its development...."'
When new forms of media and new business models present
courts with novel claims of trademark infringement, courts should
have the flexibility to construe and apply the trademark use
doctrine in a manner that serves its fundamental purposes, and is.. 310
not overly rigid or restrictive. Certainly courts should be able to
extend infringement liability to uses that are not expressly listed in
the Lanham Act section 45 definition of "use of commerce," but are
of a similar nature-closely associated with or directly referring to
goods or services the defendant is offering for sale or distribution,
and perceptible to consumers. For the same reasons, courts are not
obliged to rely on precedent created in the "acquisition of marks"
context, if that precedent does not prove a proper fit,31 ' and they
309. Leval, supra note 55, at 197; see also Stolte, supra note 162, at 1339
("The common law nature of many Lanham Act provisions implicate a judicial
interpretation with an emphasis on the flexibility typical of a common law
approach. Because the Lanham Act arguably contains at least an implicit
Congressional command to the courts to fill in gaps that Congress left open in
the statutory scheme, a common law analysis is a proper form of statutory
interpretation. Obviously, the courts must also endeavor to maintain a
reasonable degree of... flexibility.").
310. A good historical example of this flexibility can be found in the courts'
determination that a defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark in advertising could
be deemed an infringing use, even though the relevant language of the 1905
Trademark Act listed the forms of use that could be deemed infringing, and
omitted advertising use. See supra text accompanying note 103. Another good
example of the courts' flexibility in construing Lanham Act language can be
found in Lanham Act section 43(a). See supra text accompanying note 252-53.
The original language of section 43(a) did not directly suggest a general cause of
action for infringement of unregistered indications of origin, but the courts
nonetheless made it one. Congress followed the courts' lead in amending the
statutory language in 1988.
311. Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at 1610-11. Indeed,
courts have significant leeway to construe statutory language to accomplish the
statute's purpose, even when the statute at issue does not purport to codify
common law. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's differing definitions
of the word "sale" in the "acquisition" and "infringement" settings of patent law.
Compare Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (holding that for
purposes of Patent Act section 102(b), a product can be "on sale" even if no
physical embodiment of it has been made), with Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding that for purposes of infringement
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should be able to distinguish section 43(a) claims that do not allege
infringement of rights in a word or symbol 12 and dispense with the
trademark use requirement for purposes of such claims.
B. The Basic Factors of Actionable Trademark Use
While the courts clearly have leeway to adapt the trademark
use doctrine to the contemporary context of digital media and other
innovative contexts, there are a few basic factors that should anchor
courts' application of the doctrine to its historical roots and
purposes: (1) consumers should be able to perceive the defendant's
application of the allegedly confusing word or symbol; (2) the
defendant should closely associate the allegedly confusing word or
symbol with goods or services that the defendant is advertising or
offering for sale or distribution; and (3) the defendant's use of the
allegedly confusing word or symbol should make a "separate
liability, there can be no "sale" of a product until it exists in an operable
assembly).
Dinwoodie and Janis' concerns that courts may try to apply the same
standard for "trademark use" in both the acquisition of rights and infringement
context seem overstated. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion, supra note 24, at
1642-43. After all, in Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 508 F.2d
1260 (5th Cir. 1975), the classic case determining trademark use for purposes of
acquiring ownership rights, the court held that the requisite "trademark use"
was satisfied when the claimant closely associated the mark with its goods and
made the goods available to consumers in a manner that enabled them to rely
on the mark for information about source. That would seem to be the essence of
trademark use in the infringement context, as well.
Some decisions subsequent to Blue Bell, (in determining which of two
competing parties have priority of rights) have superimposed standards for the
quantity and regularity of each claimant's use, to better justify favoring one
claimant over another. See, e.g., Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
186 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 1999). Others have imposed magnitude of use
requirements (in the case of unregistered marks) to ensure that subsequent
entities seeking to acquire the same mark have fair notice of the first user's
claim. See, e.g., Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992).
Some courts have adopted additional considerations in the course of
determining the geographic scope of a prior user's market area. See, e.g., Tally-
Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018 (11th Cir. 1989). However,
neither fairness in priority contests nor equitable geographic scope of mark
owner rights is remotely relevant in evaluating the manner of the defendant's
allegedly infringing trademark use. There is no reason why courts would want
or need to import these and similar variations from the basic Blue Bell
formulation into the infringing use determination.
312. That is, section 43(a) claims that would be denominated "fraudulent
marketing" under Restatement of Torts section 712, or "passing off' under
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 4. See supra notes 130-37
and accompanying text. Obviously, for purposes of federal jurisdiction the
plaintiff would still need to demonstrate an effect on interstate commerce.
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commercial impression" on consumers. The following three
subsections discuss these factors in greater detail.
1. Perceptible to Consumers
First, trademark use fundamentally requires that consumers be
able to perceive the defendant's use of the mark. If consumers are
unable to perceive the use of the mark, then they will not be able
rely on it for information about source, sponsorship, or affiliation.
The common law and federal statutory provisions contemplatedvisual• . .313
visual perceptibility. However, courts should have the flexibility
to find that other forms of sensory perception suffice. The early
focus on visual perception can be attributed to the fact that in the
1800s and early 1900s most marks were visual in nature and were
presented to consumers visually. Today, sounds, scents, and
textures may be claimed as marks, and marks may be presented to
consumers in a greater range of ways than in the past. Consumer
perception of a mark through the sense of sound, smell, or even feel
might suffice for purposes of the trademark use doctrine, if the
opportunity for perception is closely associated with the defendant's
goods or services. The key is that consumers are confronted with
the mark in a physically ascertainable way.
On the other hand, use of a mark that is hidden from the
consumer's physical senses should not constitute trademark use.1 4
313. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (definition of "use in
commerce."); Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, §§ 16, 29, 33 Stat. 724.
314. This concept has been well established in the case law. See, e.g.,
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003); Holiday Inns, Inc.
v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996) (use of telephone number
that corresponds with the letters that spell the plaintiffs mark is not
actionable, when the defendant never promoted or advertised the translation);
Miss. Dig Sys., Inc., v. Power Plus Eng'g, Inc, 944 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (holding that to infringe, a defendant must expose consumers to the mark
itself); Site Pro-i, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (holding that hidden use of mark in metatags on defendant's site did not
constitute trademark use).
For example, in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400
(2d Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit rejected arguments that the defendant's
inclusion of the plaintiffs mark into its contextual advertising software
directory constituted a trademark use, noting:
A company's internal utilization of a trademark in a way that does not
communicate it to the public is analogous to an individual's private
thoughts about a trademark. Such conduct simply does not violate
the Lanham Act, which is concerned with the use of trademarks in
connection with the sale of goods or services in a manner likely to lead
to consumer confusion as to the source of such goods or services.
Id. at 409. But see N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211,
1219-20 (11th Cir. 2008) (disagreeing with 1-800 Contacts: "Although we
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Case decisions that have found infringement when defendants made
hidden uses of marks in metatags or in keying banner
advertisements to plaintiffs' marks either failed to adequately
consider whether the defendant's actions constituted trademark use,
or failed to recognize the purpose of the trademark use requirement
and the policy implications of their actions.315
Requiring perceptibility as a precondition to trademark use
flows naturally and logically from the concept of trademark use
itself: imperceptible uses cannot communicate source, which is the
purpose of trademarks. A defendant's imperceptible use of a mark
will not communicate source to consumers and thus will not result
in the kind of harm (consumer confusion about source) that the
trademark law is meant to preserve. However, a perceptibility
requirement also furthers important policy goals. It provides a
measure of certainty and objectivity to the trademark infringement
cause of action, thus reducing the chilling effects that threatened
infringement claims might otherwise have on competition. It
provides a rational means of limiting ever-expanding assertions of
trademark rights to those cases in which possible consumer
confusion is likely to be material and detrimental from a societal
standpoint. It also facilitates investment in new technologies that
can, through hidden applications of marks, provide consumers with
valuable, efficient, customized digital indexing, reference and search
services, and customized advertising, all of which may enhance and
tailor the flow of useful marketplace information to consumers,
lower consumer search costs, and thus enhance competition.
2. Close Association with the Defendant's Goods or Services
Some courts have held that the Lanham Act's "use" requirement
can be satisfied merely by showing that the defendant's application
of the mark occurred in a commercial context.1 6 However, to make a
trademark use the defendant should do more than act in a
believe that the absence of [any] display [of the mark] is relevant in deciding
whether there [was] a likelihood of confusion, we believe that, when the
analysis separates the element of likelihood of confusion from the other
elements, the fact is not relevant in deciding whether there is a use in
commerce in connection with the sale or advertising of any goods").
315. Barrett, supra note 3, at 423-50 (identifying and describing some of
these cases and more fully explaining why they were wrongly decided under the
trademark use doctrine).
316. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that only commercial uses, or uses in a commercial or competitive
context, can be deemed trademark uses); Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found.
for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 2008)
(following Bosley); N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1218 n.5 (following Bosley).
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commercial context: it should directly associate the mark with goods
or services that it is advertising, marketing, or distributing.317 Again,
this "close association" requirement stems from the common law and
federal statutory trademark use provisions, which specified, in most
cases, a direct physical proximity or connection. However, courts
need not adhere literally to a physical proximity rule or even to the
specific forms of use listed in Lanham Act section 45. This is
evidenced by the fact that courts have historically found trademark
use when defendants used marks in advertisements for their goods,
notwithstanding the fact that neither the 1905 Act's definition of
infringement nor the Lanham Act's section 45 definition of "use in
318
commerce" for goods refers to advertising use.
In the absence of physical proximity, courts should consider
whether the defendant closely associates the allegedly infringing
mark with its goods or services in a comparably direct or clear
manner. The historical purpose of the early affixation and later
"affixation plus other close association" requirements undoubtedly
was to ensure that there was a close enough association of mark
with goods or services to assume that consumers will mentally
connect the mark to the defendant's products or services and be able
to infer that the mark indicates the goods or services' source.
Physically attaching the mark to the goods, or to tags, labels, or
packaging provides the necessary close association, but including
the mark in direct references to the defendant's goods or services on
signs, business-related documents, print or radio advertisements, or
commercial websites may ensure the necessary mental link, as well.
In addition to ensuring that consumers are likely to infer source
from the application, the "close association" requirement makes it
more likely that the defendant's application constitutes commercial
speech and thus poses less of an imposition on First Amendment
rights.
Properly applied, the trademark use requirement should limit
trademark owners' ability to threaten or maintain prolonged
litigation of marginal infringement claims in which consumer
confusion is unlikely to outweigh the costs of protracted litigation to
First Amendment and competition interests. The proximity and
perceptibility of the defendant's use should serve as a proxy for
actual consumer understanding: courts should not undertake to
determine consumer understanding on a case-by-case basis, or to
317. See, e.g., Williams v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 961,
971 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that defendant's use must be for purpose of
promoting or selling goods or services; merely reaping economic benefit from the
use is not enough); Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 527 F.3d 1045.
318. See supra notes 102-103, 198-99, 233, and accompanying text.
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factor in possible fair use or nominative fair use possibilities. The
likelihood of confusion, fair use issues, and other substantive issues
should only become relevant once the plaintiff establishes the
defendant's trademark use. Moreover, as the Restatement of Torts
admonished , trademark use should not be found unless the
manner of the defendant's application makes it substantially likely
that consumers will regard the application as source-indicating.
This will direct judicial resources to those cases in which possible
consumer confusion costs may outweigh competing interests in
permitting the use, and limit the ability of trademark owners to
extend their rights beyond prevention of the societal harms that the
infringement cause of action was designed to target.
Several specific points should be stressed. First, the defendant
should associate the mark with goods or services. Courts have
deviated from this straightforward limitation in a couple of
important ways in the past. First, in a line of infringement and
dilution suits against cybersquatters, best exemplified by
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen 32 and Panavision International, L.P. v.
321Toeppen, courts imposed liability on defendants who registered
trademarks as domain names in order to sell the registrations to the
trademark owners at a profit. The Panavision court characterized
this as trademark use because the defendant "traded on the value of
the marks as marks by attempting to sell the domain names" to the
trademark owner.322 In affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that it did
"not matter that [the defendant] did not attach the marks to a
product. [The defendant's] commercial use was his attempt to sell
the trademarks themselves.""32  This line of decisions incorrectly
equated commercial use with trademark use and disassociated the
mark from its role in identifying the source of goods or services.
While the cybersquatter line of decisions may have reached the
correct result from an equitable standpoint, it created bad precedent
that should best be forgotten. There are better ways to address•324
cybersquatting today.
The second point is that service mark use should only be found
when the alleged mark is closely associated with meaningful
"services." Several cases have found trademark (or service mark)
319. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 727 cmt. c (1938).
320. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
321. 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
322. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303.
323. See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998);
Barrett supra note 3, at 396-402 (discussing other cases that follow this line of
reasoning, either in infringement or dilution cases, and providing further
analysis of the cited decisions).
324. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
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use when a defendant incorporated the plaintiffs mark into a
domain name and used the domain name to identify his "forum"
website, which neither sold nor advertised goods or services, but
merely stated the defendant's personal political, social, or religious
views. In order to characterize the defendant's actions as trademark
use, the courts suggested that the defendant was using the
mark/domain name to identify "information services.,325 Elevating
an individual's personal statement of religious or political opinion to
the level of a Lanham Act service goes well beyond any justifiable
definition of "services" from a policy standpoint and threatens to
bring virtually any fully protected First Amendment speech under
the control of trademark owners. In these kinds of "forum" website
cases, the trademark use requirement should be employed to protect
First Amendment interests: the defendant does not associate the
mark with any meaningful product or service that he or she is
offering or advertising for sale or distribution (and thus cannot
mislead consumers about the source of goods or services).
The third point is that the defendant must associate the mark
with goods or services it is itself advertising, offering for sale, or
distributing. Merely associating the plaintiffs mark with the
plaintiffs goods or services cannot mislead consumers about source
and is not a trademark use. While this might seem self-evident, a
number of cases in the Internet context have found that a defendant
engaged in trademark use of a mark, even though he or she neither
sold nor advertised goods or services. The defendants had registered
a domain name and set up a "forum" site, at which they expressed
their personal views about the plaintiffs goods or services, or
disagreed with religious or social positions that the plaintiff had
taken. In the resulting infringement and dilution suits, courts
reasoned that the defendant made a trademark use because, by
employing a domain name that incorporated the plaintiffs mark, the
defendant may have diverted consumers who were seeking the
plaintiffs website, and thereby affected the plaintiffs sales or
distributions of goods or services. Thus, the defendant used the
mark in connection with the plaintiffs sale or distribution of services
rather than its own. 26 Putting the defendant's use of the mark
325. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97
CIV.0629, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d
Cir. 1998); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F.
Supp. 2d 915, 919 (E.D. Va. 2000), affd, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); see also
Barrett, supra note 3, at 404-09 (providing a detailed discussion of this line of
cases and its implications).
326. See, e.g., E & J Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 275
(5th Cir. 2002); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 366;
OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2000);
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together with the plaintiffs sale of goods or services is nothing but a
play on the wording of the Lanham Act. If the defendant is not
selling, advertising, or distributing any goods or services, then his
use of the mark cannot communicate the source of his goods or
services or cause any confusion about source. This line of decisions
undermines the purpose underlying the trademark use doctrine. It
enables a mark owner to censor on-line discussion of its products
and services by threatening protracted litigation and potential
liability to anyone who uses its mark in the course of criticizing its
goods or services, as long as the criticism is effective enough to
potentially affect the plaintiffs sales. This impairs, rather than
facilitates the free flow of useful marketplace information to
consumers and seriously interferes with First Amendment rights.
The final point concerns finding trademark use in the absence of
close physical proximity. In such cases the defendant's application
of the mark should directly and immediately associate the mark
with goods or services the defendant is marketing. Use of a mark in
a domain name for a website that sells or advertises goods or
services may be a sufficiently direct association of the mark with
goods or services being advertised or offered for sale or distribution
on the site. However, a number of courts have found, in cases in
which the defendant did not sell or advertise goods or services, that
a link from the defendant's site to another site would suffice.327 In
other words, the courts assumed that consumers would associate the
defendant's use of the domain name for its own site with the goods
or services sold on the linked sites, and believe that the defendant's
use of its domain name indicated the source of the goods or services
on the linked sites. There may be cases in which it is unclear
whether it is the defendant or the linked site that is selling the
goods or services, or the circumstances may specifically indicate that
the linked and linking parties are closely related. That is by no
means always the case, however, and this line of cases appears to
assume that any time a defendant's non-commercial site links to a
commercial site, the defendant's use of its domain name is a
trademark use.
Such a connection between mark and products is highly
attenuated, and assuming it (in the absence of evidence that the
nature of the defendant's links is unclear) undercuts the policies the
trademark use doctrine should promote. Links are beneficial to
Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 309 (D.N.J. 1998), aff/d, 159 F.3d
1351 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Barrett, supra note 3, at 415-19.
327. See, e.g., Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 777 (6th Cir. 2003);
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 365; see also Barrett,
supra note 3, at 409-14.
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consumers, and are a large part of the Internet's success.
Grounding a finding of trademark use, and potential infringement
liability, on the existence of a link simply discourages defendants
from providing potentially relevant and useful links for their
visitors. Moreover, much like the decisions discussed above, the
"link" line of cases gives mark owners the means to control a great
deal of fully protected First Amendment expression on the Internet.
Accordingly, to avoid this situation, courts should carefully evaluate
trademark use claims based on links, to ensure that, under the
circumstances, the defendant's use of the mark in its domain name
provides a sufficiently direct, close association of the mark with
goods or services. The mere existence of links to commercial sites
should never be enough, in itself, to constitute trademark use.
3. Separate Commercial Impression on Consumers
Finally, while neither the common law nor the federal statutes
explicitly stated that the defendant's application of a word or symbol
must be likely to make a separate impact or "separate commercial
impression"028 on consumers, it seems clear that it must do so, in
order to constitute trademark use. This provides some assurance
that consumers are likely to be aware of defendant's use, given the
context in which it is made, and thus to associate it with the
defendant's product or service and potentially rely on it for
information about source.3 29 Relevant factors might include where
and how the word or symbol appears on the defendant's product
label, tag, packaging, letterhead, documentation, market or website
displays, signs, advertisements, or other material. Does the use of
the mark stand out? Is it likely to be noticed? If the mark is used
aurally, as in radio advertising, does it stand out on its own? This is
an area in which courts could probably safely borrow from cases and
treatises addressing the issue of trademark use for purposes of
328. I use the phrase "separate commercial impression" here as a term of
art-to draw an analogy to case law that discusses this concept, primarily in the
acquisition of rights context. See, e.g., UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 807, 12(d); 1202.05(c), 1202.08(d),
1211.01(b)(ii) (5th ed.). I do not mean to suggest that nonprofit entities are
incapable of engaging in trademark use.
329. See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134
F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[It is not the case that all inherently distinctive
symbols or words on a product function as trademarks.... Rather, in order to
be protected as a valid trademark, a designation must create 'a separate and
distinct commercial impression, which . .. performs the trademark function of
identifying the source of the merchandise to the customers.'") (quoting In re
Chem. Dynamics, Inc., 839 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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CONCLUSION
The historical "trademark use" prerequisite to infringement
liability clearly remains in United States law today, and courts
should construe and apply it in light of its original purpose and in
light of modern circumstances and public policy concerns. While
there may be other factors that courts might beneficially entertain,
close, direct association, perceptibility, and "separate commercial
impression" are directly linked to the historical background and
purpose of the trademark use doctrine and promote a range of public
policy interests. If firmly and rationally applied, the trademark use
requirement should assist in attaining a proper balance between the
interest in effective protection of marketplace signals, on one hand,
and the interests in free expression, robust competition, the free and
efficient flow of useful commercial information to consumers, and
the development of new and useful digital technologies, on the other.
330. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 161, § 3:3.
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